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Introduction
At least 22,000 Minnesotans' suffer from a serious and persis-
* The author is a student at the University of Minnesota Law School and will
receive her J.D. in May, 1990.
1. It is estimated that one percent of the adult population and from 22,368 to
29,824 Minnesotans have a serious and persistent mental illness. Telephone inter-
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tent mental illness.2 Many live outside their own homes in resi-
dential programs which provide care, supervision, and treatment.3
Until the 1960s, supervised residential programs did not exist; per-
sons with mental illness who were in need of residential treatment
were institutionalized.4 Institutionalization was a very severe ex-
pression of prejudice 5 in that its primary purpose was not to pro-
vide treatment and care but to isolate persons with mental illness
and protect society from them.6
Today, persons with mental illness are no longer being insti-
tutionalized on a grand scale. The status quo favors deinstitution-
alization. Several factors have contributed to this movement. The
administration of John F. Kennedy established the return to the
view with Jerry Stork, Statistician for Mental Health Division, Minnesota Dep't of
Human Services (Nov. 9, 1988).
2. Minn. Stat. § 245.462, subd. 20(a) (1988), defines mental illness:
"Mental illness" means an organic disorder of the brain or a clinically
significant disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, memory,
or behavior that is listed in the clinical manual of the International
Classification of Diseases (ICD-9-CM), current edition, code range
290.0 to 302.99 or 306.0 to 316.0... and that seriously limits a person's
capacity to function in primary aspects of daily living such as personal
relations, living arrangements, work, and recreation.
Minn. Stat. § 245.462, subd. 20(c) (1988) defines a person with serious and persistent
mental illness:
[A] person who has a mental illness and meets at least one of the fol-
lowing criteria:
(1) the person has undergone two or more episodes of inpatient
care for mental illness within the preceding 24 months;
(2) the person has experienced a continuous psychiatric hospital-
ization or residential treatment exceeding six months' duration within
the preceding 12 months;
(3) the person:
(i) has a diagnosis of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, major de-
pression, or borderline personality disorder;
(ii) indicates a significant impairment in functioning;, and
(iii) has a written opinion from a mental health professional stat-
ing that the person is reasonably likely to have future episodes requir-
ing inpatient or residential treatment, of a frequency described in
clause (1) or (2), unless an ongoing community support services pro-
gram is provided; or
(4) the person has been committed by a court as a mentally ill
person ....
3. See Ernst & Whinney, Department of Human Services Housing Study Sum-
mary 30 (Feb. 5, 1988) (on file with Law & Inequality).
4. Gilda Tuoni, Deinstitutionalization and Community Resistance by Zoning
Restrictions, 66 Mass. L. Rev. 125, 129-30 (1981).
5. The desire to institutionalize persons with mental illness resulted from atti-
tudes attributing mental illness to a wicked nature or supernatural causes. See id.
at 129. Prejudice has been defined as irrational hostility toward a group of people
whose evil attributes are exaggerated and overgeneralized. Gordon Allport, The
Nature of Prejudice 15, 403 (1958).
6. Minnesota State Planning Agency, Minnesota State Hospitals 3 (1985).
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community of persons with mental illness as a national goal.7 Fed-
eral legislation has authorized funding to promote deinstitutional-
ization.8 Mental health professionals advocate the principle of
normalization, 9 based on the belief that community integration
permits disabled persons to grow and develop to the maximum
possible extent and become contributing members of society.lO At
least one state court has recognized the right of persons with
mental illness to treatment in the least restrictive setting."
In Minnesota, the number of persons with mental illness liv-
ing in state hospitals has decreased from 10,093 in 1960 to 1,230 in
1984.12 Prejudice against persons with mental illness continues to
find expression, however, as deinstitutionalization has not resulted
in community integration and acceptance. Society has found a
means more subtle than institutionalization to isolate persons with
mental illness: local zoning ordinances that operate to exclude
community residential programsl 3 from most neighborhoods.14
A Minnesota statute,15 which purports to advance state policy
7. Note, Zoning for the Mentally IlL" A Legislative Mandate, 16 Harv. J. on
Legis. 853, 853 (1979).
8. See generally id. at 862-66.
9. Normalization is "the principle of providing the 'patterns of life and condi-
tions of everyday living which are as close as possible to the regular circumstances
and ways of life of society."' Zoning for Community Homes Serving Developmen-
tally Disabled Persons, 2 Mental Disability L. Rep. 794, 795 (May-June 1978) [here-
inafter Zoning for Community Homes] (quoting B. Nirje, The Normalization
Principle, in Changing Patterns in Residential Services for the Mentally Retarded
231 (R. Kugel & A. Shearer eds. 1976)).
10. Id.
11. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other
grounds and remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
12. See Minnesota State Planning Agency, supra note 6, at 6.
13. Minn. Stat. § 245A.02, subd. 14 (1988) defines a residential program:
"[A] program that provides 24-hour-a-day care, supervision, food, lodg-
ing, rehabilitation, training, education, habilitation, or treatment
outside a person's own home ... to provide services for five or more
persons whose primary diagnosis is ... mental illness..."
Residential programs for persons with mental illness must be licensed under Minn.
R. 9520.0500-9520.0690 (1987).
14. See Note, supra note 7, at 869.
15. The provisions of Minn. Stat. § 245A.11 (1988) are as follows:
Subdivision 1. Policy statement. It is the policy of the state that
persons shall not be excluded by municipal zoning ordinances or other
land use regulations from the benefits of normal residential surround-
ings.
Subd. 2. Permitted single-family residential use. Residential pro-
grams with a licensed capacity of six or fewer persons shall be consid-
ered a permitted single-family residential use of property for the
purposes of zoning and other land use regulations.
Subd. 3. Permitted multifamily residential use. Unless otherwise
provided in any town, municipal, or county zoning regulation, a li-
censed residential program with a licensed capacity of seven to 16
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prohibiting exclusionary zoning practices directed towards commu-
adults or children shall be considered a permitted multifamily residen-
tial use of property for the purposes of zoning and other land use regu-
lations. A town, municipal, or county zoning authority may require a
conditional use or special use permit to assure proper maintenance and
operation of a residential program. Conditions imposed on the resi-
dential program must not be more restrictive than those imposed on
other conditional uses or special uses of residential property in the
same zones, unless the additional conditions are necessary to protect
the health and safety of the adults or children being served by the pro-
gram. Nothing in sections 245A.01 to 245A.16 shall be construed to ex-
clude or prohibit residential programs from single-family zones if
otherwise permitted by local zoning regulations.
Subd 4. Location of residential programs. In determining
whether to grant a license, the commissioner shall specifically consider
the population, size, land use plan, availability of community services,
and the number and size of existing licensed residential programs in
the town, municipality, or county in which the applicant seeks to oper-
ate a residential program. The commissioner shall not grant an initial
license to any residential program if the residential program will be
within 1,320 feet of an existing residential program unless the town,
municipality, or county zoning authority grants the residential pro-
gram a conditional use or special use permit. In cities of the first class,
this subdivision applies even if a residential program is considered a
permitted single-family residential use of property under subdivision
2. Foster care homes are exempt from this subdivision.
Subd. 5. Overconcentration and dispersal. (a) Before January 1,
1985, each county having two or more group residential programs
within 1,320 feet of each other shall submit to the department of
human services a plan to promote dispersal of group residential pro-
grams. In formulating its plan, the county shall solicit the participa-
tion of affected persons, programs, municipalities having highly
concentrated residential program populations, and advocacy groups.
For the purposes of this subdivision, "highly concentrated" means hav-
ing a population in residential programs serving seven or more persons
that exceeds one-half of one percent of the population of a recognized
planning district or other administrative subdivision.
(b) Within 45 days after the county submits the plan, the commis-
sioner shall certify whether the plan fulfills the purposes and require-
ments of this subdivision including the following requirements:
(1) a new program serving seven or more persons must not be lo-
cated in any recognized planning district or other administrative subdi-
vision where the population in residential programs is highly
concentrated;
(2) the county plan must promote dispersal of highly concentrated
residential program populations;
(3) the county plan shall promote the development of residential
programs in areas that are not highly concentrated;
(4) no person in a residential program shall be displaced as a re-
sult of this section until a relocation plan has been implemented that
provides for an acceptable alternative placement;
(5) if the plan provides for the relocation of residential programs,
the relocation must be completed by January 1, 1990. If the commis-
sioner certifies that the plan does not do so, the commissioner shall
state the reasons, and the county has 30 days to submit a plan
amended to comply with the requirements of the commissioner.
(c) After July 1, 1985, the commissioner may reduce grants under
section 245.73 to a county required to have an approved plan under
paragraph (a) if the county does not have a plan approved by the com-
missioner or if the county acts in substantial disregard of its approved
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nity residential programs, actually legitimizes a powerful means by
which municipalities block the siting of group homes with a maxi-
mum licensed capacity of seven or more individuals. Subdivision 2
of the statute designates residential programs with a licensed ca-
pacity of six or fewer persons as a permitted single-family residen-
tial use of property for purposes of zoning and other land use
regulation.16 Subdivision 3, however, allows municipalities to re-
quire a conditional use permit for larger group homes.17 This pro-
vision impacts persons with mental illness, who are generally
served by residential programs with licensed capacities in excess of
six.18 The result is exclusion of larger residential programs either
directly through denial of the permit or indirectly through avoid-
ance of the burdensome conditional use permit process by prospec-
tive group home providers.19
The statute addresses concentration of residential programs
by establishing a separation requirement of at least 1,320 feet.20
This provision has two objectives. The most often articulated is to
prevent the establishment of group home ghettos such as those
which exist in low income neighborhoods of both Minneapolis and
St. Paul.21 The second objective, which is primary but infre-
quently voiced, is to protect communities against more than their
"fair share" of the programs.22 By establishing a separation re-
quirement based on the concept of "fair share," the statute implic-
itly recognizes persons who live in community residential
programs as undesirable.23 The ultimate goal of normalization of
persons with mental illness is hindered by both the conditional use
permit and separation requirements in the Minnesota statute.
The purpose of this article is to propose model legislation re-
plan. The county board has the right to be provided with advance no-
tice and to appeal the commissioner's decision. If the county requests
a hearing within 30 days of the notification of intent to reduce grants,
the commissioner shall not certify any reduction in grants until a
hearing is conducted and a decision made in accordance with the con-
tested case provisions of chapter 14.
Subd. 6. Hospitals; exemption. Residential programs located in
hospitals shall be exempt from the provisions of this section.
16. Id. Subd. 2.
17. Id. Subd. 3.
18. Statistics compiled by the Minnesota Department of Human Services,
Mental Health Division (Jan. 20, 1989) (on file with Law & Inequality).
19. See inLfra text accompanying notes 264-269.
20. Minn. Stat. § 245A.11, subd. 4.
21. See Martin Jaffe & Thomas P. Smith, Siting Group Homes for Developmen-
tally Disabled Persons, 397 American Planning Association Planning Advisory Ser-
vice 12 (1986). See also Zoning for Community Homes, supra note 9, at 799.
22. See Jaffe & Smith, supra note 21, at 12. See also Mpls. Star & Tribune,
July 24, 1988 at B1, col. 1.
23. See Jaffe & Smith, supra note 21, at 13.
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lated to residential programs that will combat exclusionary zoning.
Since many states have enacted laws similar to Minnesota's stat-
ute,24 the discussion and recommendations concerning statutory
changes are relevant beyond Minnesota's borders. Section I re-
views municipal zoning power and the parameters of zoning ordi-
nances. Section II discusses common neighborhood concerns
which prompt community resistance to residential programs for
persons with mental illness. Section III outlines pertinent judicial
decisions related to exclusionary zoning and case law which can be
derived from the decisions. Section IV discusses the need to in-
crease governmental and community involvement in the siting of
residential treatment programs for persons with mental illness.
Section V describes the conditional use permit requirement and
sets forth alternatives which do not weigh as heavily against com-
munity location of residential programs for persons with mental
illness. Section VI discusses various state efforts aimed at prevent-
ing concentration and promoting dispersal of residential programs.
Alternatives for state legislative action derived from the various
state approaches are set forth in Section VIII. Model legislation is
located in Appendix A and summaries of the case law discussed in
Section III are in Appendix B.
I. Zoning
Zoning is the regulation by a municipality of the use of land,
buildings, and structures located in the community.25 While zoning
authority is broadly based on the municipality's exercise of the po-
lice power,26 the power to zone in Minnesota exists only as dele-
gated by the state legislature.27
Zoning ordinances create distinct zones within a municipality
and restrict the use of land and buildings within each zone.28 Resi-
dential zones are subdivided into single-family and multi-family
24. Lester Steinman, The Fffect of Land-Use Restrictions on the Establishment
of Community Residences for the Disabled- A National Study, 19 Urb. Law. 1, 18-20
(1987).
25. 1 Arden Rathkopf & Daren Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning
§ 1.01 (4th ed. 1988); 1 Patrick Rohan, Zoning and Land Use Controls § 1.02 (1988).
26. 1 Rohan, supra note 25, § 1.02 (regulations for the protection of public
safety, welfare, health, and morals constitute valid exercise of the police power).
See also Minn. Stat. § 462.357, subd. 1 (1988) (grant of zoning authority for the pur-
pose of promoting the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare).
27. Minn. Stat. § 462.351 (1988); Denney v. City of Duluth, 295 Minn. 22, 26, 202
N.W.2d 892, 894 (1972).
28. For zoning purposes, land use is classified as residential, commercial, and in-
dustrial. The need for flexibility is accomodated through zoning techniques such as
conditional use permits. See 1 Rathkopf & Rathkopf, supra note 25, § 1.02.
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districts.29 Single-family residential zones are usually open only to
dwellings occupied by related persons or a small number of unre-
lated persons.3O This type of ordinance is typically used to exclude
community residential programs from neighborhoods. 31
A conditional use permit 32 requirement can also prevent the
placement of community residential programs. 33 A fundamental
part of the conditional use permit review process is a public hear-
ing.34 Neighboring landowners are notified of the hearing and
may attend to protest the location of a proposed residential pro-
gram.35 These hearings become very heated and local "decision
makers are often persuaded by the fervor and number of oppo-
nents and not necessarily by the merit of their testimony."30 The
legitimacy of opponents' concerns about residential programs will
be discussed in the next section.
II. Common Neighborhood Concerns
Objections to residential programs fall into three groups: eco-
nomic, primarily property devaluation; safety, usually focused on
the perceived criminality of the program residents; and esthetics,
primarily concerns about unusual behavior of residents and inade-
29. See Minn. Stat. § 462.357 (1988). Minn. Stat. § 462.357 also allows control
through establishment of regulations concerning the location, height, width, bulk,
type of foundation, number of stories, size of buildings and other structures, and
percentage of lot which may be occupied, the sizes of yards and other open spaces,
and the density and distribution of population.
30. See, e.g., St. Paul Planning Commission Task Force on Community Residen-
tial Facilities, Task Force Report 9 (1988); United States General Accounting Office,
An Analysis of Zoning and Other Problems Affecting the Establishment of Group
Homes for the Mentally Disabled 2 (1983).
31. Note, supra note 7, at 871.
32. Conditionally permitted uses are uses which "are troublesome even in dis-
tricts where they logically belong." 2 Robert Anderson, American Law of Zoning
§ 9.18 (3d ed. 1986).
Under Minn. Stat. § 462.3595, subd. 1 (1988), municipalities may designate cer-
tain types of developments and development activities as conditional uses under
zoning regulations. According to the statute, these uses may be approved if the
standards and criteria established by the ordinance are satisfied. Id. The terms
conditional use, special use, special use permit, and special exception are alternative
terms used to designate a conditionally permitted use.
A permitted use differs from a conditionally permitted use in that it signals use
by right specifically authorized in a particular zoning district. Zoning for Commu-
nity Homes, supra note 9, at 796 n.15.
33. Note, supra note 7, at 871.
34. Jaffe & Smith, supra note 21, at 31.
35. Note, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center: Denial of Quasi-Suspect
Status for the Mentally Retarded and Its Effect on Exclusionary Zoning of Group
Homes, 17 Tol. L.Rev. 1041, 1060 (1986).
36. Jaffe & Smith, supra note 21, at 31.
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quate property maintenance. The following discussion demon-
strates that these objections are unsubstantiated.
A. Economic Objections
Research shows that residential programs do not decrease the
value of neighboring homes. In a 1975 study of community resi-
dential facilities within the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan
area, the University of Minnesota Center for Urban and Regional
Affairs (CURA) found evidence that decreasing property values
are not associated with the location of community residential pro-
grams.3 7 The Community Residences Information Services Pro-
gram (CRISP) prepared a summary of studies addressing
commonly expressed fears about the effects of group homes on
neighborhoods.38 The forty reported works included impact stud-
ies, surveys, literature reviews, and position papers, none of which
revealed lowered property values or increased turnover of prop-
erty in areas where community residential programs were located.
In 1988, the Mental Health Law Project published an annotated
bibliography3 9 including "every available study on the subject" of
property devaluation,40 and reported that "[t]he studies conclu-
sively establish that a group home or community residential facil-
ity (CRF) for mentally disabled people does not adversely affect
neighbors' property values or destabilize a neighborhood."41
B. Safety Concerns
Nearly all systematic, empirical work shows that the involve-
ment of mentally ill persons in violent crime is equal to or only
slightly more than that of the general population.42 One study
tested the stereotype of the mentally ill person as dangerous and
prone to commit crime and revealed that persons with mental ill-
37. Alan S. Friedlob & Thomas L. Anding, Community-Based Residential Facil-
ities in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area: Location and Community Response 23
(1975).
38. Community Residences Information Services Program, "There Goes the
Neighborhood . . ." A Summary of Studies Addressing the Most Often Expressed
Fears About the Effects of Group Homes on Neighborhoods in Which They Are
Placed: Declining Property Values, Crime, Deteriorating Quality of Life and Loss
of Local Control (1986) [hereinafter CRISP]. The studies included group homes for
persons with mental illness, mental retardation, and chemical dependency. Id. at ii.
39. Mental Health Law Project, The Effects of Group Homes on Neighboring
Property: An Annotated Bibliography 1988.
40. Id. at i.
41. Id.
42. Case Comment, Community Commitment: To Accept or Reject the Mentally
1l?- City of Terrance v. Transitional Living Centers, Inc., 5 Whittier L. Rev. 417,
422 (1983) (quoting S.E. Estroff, Making It Crazy 11 (1981)).
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ness do not commit serious crimes at a disproportionate rate.43
Thus, the safety of a neighborhood is not negatively impacted by a
residential program for persons with mental illness.
C. Esthetics
Studies contradict the common misconception that group
homes are not well-maintained. A 1980 impact study of thirty-
eight group homes found that, with one exception, the exterior
condition of the group homes was equal to or better than that of
surrounding properties.44 A survey of thirty-two group homes,
conducted in 1982, revealed that the homes were well-main-
tained.45 Should maintenance problems arise with regard to spe-
cific homes, state licensing laws and regulations could provide
authority for the enforcement of maintenance requirements.
Another aspect of the esthetics issue is concern about the ec-
centric or unusual behavior of group home residents.46 While li-
censing regulations and program reviews should deal with
prevention of behavior which is indecent or violative of the rights
of others and require group home operators to be responsive to
community complaints, society must become more tolerant of dif-
ferent behavior which is not harmful. Tolerance of diversity
among people is an important American value that promotes
greater understanding and benefits not only those classified as dif-
ferent, but society as a whole.
Based upon these studies, it appears that most community ob-
jections are grounded in generalizations and intolerance. In City
of C7eburne v. Cleburne Living Center,47 Justice Marshall refers to
Gordon Allport's theory that separateness among groups exagger-
ates difference. 48 Justice Marshall concludes that "isolation of the
retarded has perpetuated the ignorance, irrational fears, and stere-
43. CRISP, supra note 38, at 11 (summarizing Lawrence Teplin, The Criminal-
ity of the Mentally Ilk A Dangerous Misconception, 142 Am. J. Psych. 593 (1985)).
44. Id. at 12 (summarizing Sherry Wickware & Tom Goodale, Promoting and
Resisting Group Homes: The Property Value Issue, 4 Leisurability, 24 (1980)).
45. Id. at 4 (summarizing Lawrence Dolan & Julian Wolpert, Long Term
Neighborhood Property Impacts of Group Homes for Mentally Retarded People
(1982)).
46. Homeowners on Pillsbury Avenue in south Minneapolis have voiced com-
plaints about "A heavy old man with the open shirt who urinates on boulevard
trees in daylight. The man who every day sweeps the sidewalks and the alley and
weeds other people's lawns. The people who wander around in winter parkas on
sweltering summer days .... Mpls. Star & Tribune, July 24, 1988 at B1, col.2.
47. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). For a discussion of City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, see infra text accompanying notes 65-70.
48. Id. at 464 (citing Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (1958)).
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otyping that long have plagued them."49 It follows that isolation of
persons with mental illness has also perpetuated prejudice and
that community integration will diminish the prejudice. The more
advanced a civilization becomes, the more it will understand,
value, and relate to its members who have severe handicapping
conditions.50
III. Case Law
The courts have not looked favorably upon zoning efforts to
exclude persons with mental illness from communities. This sec-
tion reviews United States Supreme Court and state court deci-
sions related to exclusionary zoning. The model legislation in
Appendix A is based, in part, on parameters established by these
decisions.
A. United States Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court employs a very deferential
standard when reviewing matters related to zoning.51 This stan-
dard is based on the tenth amendment, under which state and lo-
cal governments acquire the police power, 52 and on the Court's
reluctance to impair the effectiveness of state and local govern-
ments. The Court articulated this standard in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.,53 where it held that zoning measures were
valid unless "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no sub-
stantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general wel-
fare."m Thus, according to the Court, zoning is a local problem
properly challenged in state courts or through the local democratic
49. Id.
50. CRISP, supra note 38, at 9 (summarizing Martha Perske & Robert Perske,
New Life in the Neighborhood: How Persons with Disabilities Can Help Make a
Community Better (1980)).
51. See Note, supra note 7, at 1055.
52. Police power is
[a]n authority conferred by the American constitutional system in the
Tenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution, upon the individual states, and,
in turn, delegated to local governments, through which they are ena-
bled to establish a special department of police; adopt such laws and
regulations as tend to prevent the commission of fraud and crime, and
secure generally the comfort, safety, morals, health, and prosperity of
its citizens by preserving the public order, preventing a conflict of
rights in the common intercourse of the citizens, and insuring to each
an uninterrupted enjoyment of all the privileges conferred upon him
or her by the general laws.
Black's Law Dictionary 1041 (5th ed. 1979).
53. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).




Constitutional challenges to a zoning ordinance were rejected
in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,56 where six male and female
college students renting a house in a single-family residential dis-
trict were cited for violating a zoning ordinance which defined
"family" as persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption or not
more than two unrelated persons.57 The ordinance was challenged
as violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution and the constitutional
rights of association, travel, and privacy. 8 The Court upheld the
ordinance, describing the police power as "ample to lay out zones
where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclu-
sion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people."59
The Belle Terre holding was limited in Moore v. City of East
C/eveland.60 In Moore, the Court struck down a zoning ordinance
which generally restricted occupants of single family dwellings to
members of nuclear families.61 Inez Moore was convicted for vio-
lating the ordinance because her two grandsons lived with her.62
In striking down the ordinance, the Court held that its usual def-
erence was inappropriate when the government intruded on
choices concerning family living arrangements.63 The Court fur-
ther declared that strong constitutional protection of the sanctity
of the family is not confined within the arbitrary boundary drawn
at the limits of the nuclear family.64
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,65 the United
States Supreme Court struck down a zoning ordinance that re-
quired a special use permit for a group home for people with
mental retardation.6 6 Among the permitted uses were boarding
houses, fraternities, hospitals, sanitariums, and nursing homes.67
The Court held that prejudice and unsubstantiated fears were not
permissible bases for treating the group home differently from
boarding houses and nursing homes and invalidated the zoning or-
55. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 n.18 (1975). See also Note, Zoning for
the Regional Welfare, 89 Yale L.J. 748, 758-59 (1980).
56. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
57. Id. at 2-3.
58. Id. at 7-8.
59. Id. at 9.
60. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
61. Id. at 499-500.
62. Id. at 496-97.
63. Id. at 502-03.
64. Id. at 504-06.
65. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
66. Id. at 435.
67. Id. at 436 n.3.
1989]
Law and Inequality
dinance as it was applied to the group home.68 This case is signifi-
cant because although the Court declined to confer suspect or
quasi-suspect status on persons with mental retardation, it struck
down the application of the zoning ordinance under the rational
basis test.69 The holding in Cleburne is narrow and leaves open
the possibility that a special use permit could be required for group
homes if the necessity was based on reasons other than irrational
prejudice against the mentally retarded.70
In summary, the Supreme Court will show broad deference
to a community's power to zone, except where constitutional limi-
tations are clearly surpassed. This deferential approach results in
cautious constitutional determinations and narrow holdings.
B. Minnesota State Courts
While challenges to zoning practices under the federal consti-
tution are rarely successful, state courts often invalidate exclusion-
ary zoning ordinances on state constitutional or statutory
grounds.71 Minnesota courts have consistently ruled in favor of
residential programs threatened by zoning practices.
In the leading case, Costley v. Caromin House, Inc.,72 the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that a community residential pro-
gram for six mentally retarded adults and two resident
houseparents was a family within the meaning of the city zoning
68. Id. at 450.
69. Social and economic legislation is generally presumed valid, and will be sus-
tained if rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Id. at 440. The ra-
tional basis test has been described as "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually
none in fact." Gerald Gunther, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972). Where legislation seeks
to classify groups which have been designated a suspect or quasi-suspect class, the
legislation is subject to strict or intermediate scrutiny, respectively. Cleburne, 473
U.S. at 440-41. One commentator has posited that the Court is moving away from a
clearly delineated two or three standard approach to a spectrum of standards as dis-
crimination claims are reviewed. Gerald Gunther, Cases and Materials on Constitu-
tional Law 589-91 (11th ed. 1985). Under the spectrum of standards, the level of
scrutiny employed by the Court depends on the "constitutional and societal impor-
tance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the ba-
sis upon which the particular classification is drawn." Id. at 590 (citing San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1972) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting)).
The Court has designated only three classifications as suspect: race, alienage,
and national origin. C/eburne, 473 U.S. at 440. Gender and illegitimacy have been
recognized as quasi-suspect. Id. at 440-41. The Court has used several explicit crite-
ria to identify suspect and quasi-suspect classifications: a history of discrimination,
political powerlessness, and immutability. Id. at 441.
70. See Steinman, supra note 24, at 10.
71. See Note, supra note 35, at 1056; Steinman, supra note 24, at 10.
72. 313 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 1981).
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ordinance. 73 The ordinance defined "family" as "[o]ne or more
persons occupying a premises and living as a single housekeeping
unit .. .. ,74 The court declared that the residents and
houseparents were a single housekeeping unit as the residents
shared in planning and preparation of meals, performing house-
keeping duties and planning recreational activities, and the
houseparents served the head of household role.75 In addition to
the language of the ordinance in question, the court relied on case
law from other jurisdictions where the family designation was ex-
tended to group homes even when local zoning ordinances limited
the definition of "family" to related persons.76 The court asserted
that "[t]he word 'family' is no longer limited to a traditional con-
cept of marriage and biological ties"77 and that "[s]o long as the
group home bears the generic character of a family unit as a rela-
tively permanent household, and is not a framework for transients
* . , it conforms to the purpose of the ordinance."7 8 The Costley
court also held that since the group home served a residential pur-
pose, operation of the home by a for-profit corporation did not
make it commercial in nature.79
In response to a claim that the group home would violate a
restrictive covenant permitting only one dwelling and one garage
on each lot,8 0 the court held that the group home fit the definition
of dwelling both in appearance and use, and therefore complied
with the covenant.81 The court noted that even if the covenant
were interpreted to permit only single-family dwellings, the defini-
tion of "family" for the purposes of zoning regulations would ap-
ply.8 2 Additionally, other state court decisions were cited in which
group homes were found in compliance with single-family restric-
73. Id. at 25.
74. Id. at 24.
75. Id. at 25.
76. Id. (citing Hessling v. City of Broomfield, 193 Colo. 124, 563 P.2d 12 (1977);
Berger v. State, 71 N.J. 206, 364 A.2d 993 (1976); City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34
N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974)).
77. Id.
78. Id. (quoting City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 305-06, 313
N.E.2d 756, 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449, 453 (1974)). The Court did not rely on Minn. Stat.
§ 462.357, subd. 7 (1980) (current version Minn. Stat. § 245A.11 (1988)) to reach its
decision. Broad construction of the term family allows the possibility that group
homes serving more than six residents would be considered permitted uses in areas
zoned for single-family residential use.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 26. The court prefaced its discussion of this issue by asserting the ba-
sic principle that restrictive covenants are strictly construed against limitations on





tive covenants based on the single housekeeping structure, the rel-
atively permanent type of living situation, and public policy
supporting such living arrangements.8 3
A Minnesota statute establishes that licensed group homes
for six or fewer persons with mental retardation are a single-fam-
ily use for zoning purposes.8 4 The plaintiffs in Costley alleged that
this statute represented an "arbitrary and capricious imposition of
legislative will upon local zoning matters and therefore unconstitu-
tional as a violation of due process."8 5 The court rejected this
claim, citing Denney v. City of Duluth,86 which held that a munici-
pality has no inherent power to enact zoning regulations.8 7 Ac-
cording to Denney, a municipality receives power to zone only by a
legislative grant of authority.8 8 The Costley court said that "in ex-
ercising such a delegation of power, a municipality cannot exceed
the limitations imposed by the enabling legislation."8 9
Another case addressing group homes and zoning practices in
Minnesota is Northwest Residence, Inc. v. City of Brooklyn
Center.90 Decided in 1984 by the Minnesota Court of Appeals, the
case involved an action to compel the city to issue a special use
permit to a group home for eighteen adults with mental illness.91
Although the Brooklyn Center Planning Commission recom-
mended approval, the City Council denied the special use permit
after holding a public hearing on the matter.92 Reasons for denial
included inadequate parking and recreational facilities, diminution
of enjoyment of adjacent property, and a determination that the
group home contained adequate space for only twelve adults with
mental illness.93 The court rejected these reasons and ordered is-
suance of the special use permit, concurring with the lower court's
findings that the claims which involved parking, recreational
space, and diminution of property were not supported by the evi-
83. Id. (citing State ex. rel. Region II Child & Family Services, Inc. v. District
Court of the Eighth Judicial Circuit, 609 P.2d 245 (Mont. 1980); Bellarmine Hills
Assoc. v. Residential Systems Co., 84 Mich. App. 554, 269 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App.
1978); Berger v. State, 71 N.J. 206, 364 A.2d 993 (1976)).
84. Minn. Stat. § 245A.11 (1988) (former version at Minn. Stat. § 462.357, subd. 7
(1980)).
85. Costley, 313 N.W.2d at 27.
86. 295 Minn. 22, 202 N.W.2d 892 (1972).
87. Id. at 26, 202 N.W.2d at 894.
88. Id.
89. Costley, 313 N.W.2d at 27 (quoting Reilly Tax & Chem. Corp. v. City of St.
Louis Park, 265 Minn. 295, 300, 121 N.W.2d 393, 396 (1963)).
90. 352 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
91. Id. at 765.
92. Id. at 766.
93. Id. at 765.
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dence. 94 In response to the city's claim that the proposed group
home was too small for eighteen adults with mental illness, the
court emphasized that the space was adequate according to munici-
pal occupancy standards and state licensing requirements.95
The court held that state law preempts local authority in the
area of ensuring an appropriate living environment in residential
facilities for the mentally ill.96 Responding to the city's argument
that state law97 permits municipalities to impose special conditions
on residential facilities if necessary to protect the health and safety
of the residents, the court ruled that this grant of authority must
be interpreted narrowly and not "in a manner that would run
against state regulations on the operation of residential facilities,
or undermine the state policy of favoring the establishment of
community residential facilities."9 8
Concluding that the statute permitted the city only to impose
"special health and safety standards appropriate to the characteris-
tics of a particular site," the court held they could not "establish
special regulations concerning the general welfare of mentally ill
adults."99 The court supported this holding by referencing Minn.
Stat. § 462.351 and § 462.357, subd. 1 (1982).100 Minn. Stat.
§ 462.351 (1988), which has not been amended since 1982, generally
sets forth public policy relating to the need for municipal planning.
Minn. Stat. § 462.357, subd. 1 (1988),1O1 also unchanged since 1982
94. Id. at 768-70, 774. The court found that the group home management was
willing and able to comply with parking requirements, that recreational space was
adequate, and no evidence had been presented to support the claim that the pro-
posed group home would cause diminution of adjacent property values. Id. at 768-
69. Judicial notice was taken of a Minneapolis Planning Commission national liter-
ature search which revealed no decrease in values of property adjacent to group
homes unless there were five such facilities in a block. Id. at 770. The court also
observed that a Minneapolis Planning Commission survey found that people who
live next to licensed facilities sew the residents as good neighbors. Id.
95. Id. at 771-72.
96. Id. at 772.
97. Minn. Stat. § 245.812, subd. 4 (1982) (current version at Minn. Stat.
§ 245A.11, subd. 3 (1988)).
98. Northwest Residence, Inc. v. City of Brooklyn Center, 352 N.W.2d 764, 773
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
99. Id. at 773-74.
100. Id. at 773.
101. Minn. Stat. § 462.357, subd. 1 provides:
Subdivision 1. Authority for zoning. For the purpose of promoting the
public health, safety, morals and general welfare, a municipality may
by ordinance regulate on the earth's surface, in the air space above the
surface, and in subsurface areas, the location, height width, bulk type
of foundation, number of stories, size of buildings and other struc-
tures, the percentage of lot which may be occupied, the size of yards
and other open spaces the density and distribution of population, the
uses of buildings and structures for trade, industry, residence, recrea-
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except for a clarification irrelevant for purposes of this article,102
provides zoning authority to municipalities. The statute authorizes
regulation of the location and external characteristics of buildings,
percentage of lot which may be occupied, size of yards, density and
distribution of population, and uses which may be made of build-
ings.x0 3 According to the statute, regulations must be uniform for
each class of building and kind of use throughout each district.104
Given the language of the Northwest Residence decision and
statutory references therein, Minn. Stat.§ 245A.11, subd. 3 (1988)
permits municipalities to impose special health and safety stan-
dards for the protection of residents of state-licensed residential
programs only when the standards relate to the areas listed under
Minn. Stat. § 462.357, subd. 1 (1988) and are applied uniformly to
all similar buildings in the district. Additionally, municipalities
are prohibited by Northwest Residence from establishing standards
concerning services provided to or proper care of the residents or
to any other area covered by state rules governing licensure of res-
tion, public activities, or other purposes, and the uses of land for
trade, industry, residence, recreation, agriculture, forestry, soil conser-
vation, water supply conservation, conservation of shorelands, as de-
fined in section 105.485, access to direct sunlight for solar energy
systems as defined in section 116J.06, flood control or other purposes,
and may establish standards and procedures regulating such uses. No
regulation may prohibit earth sheltered construction as defined in sec-
tion 116J.06, subdivision 2, or manufactured homes built in conform-
ance with sections 327.31 to 327.35 that comply with all other zoning
ordinances promulgated pursuant to this section. The regulations may
divide the surface, above surface, and subsurface areas of the munici-
pality into districts or zones of suitable numbers, shape and area. The
regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of buildings, struc-
tures or land and for each class or kind of use throughout such dis-
trict, but the regulations in one district may differ from those in other
districts. The ordinance embodying these regulations shall be known
as the zoning ordinance and shall consist of text and maps. A city may
by ordinance extend the application of its zoning regulations to unin-
corporated territory located within two miles of its limits in any direc-
tion, but not in a county or town which has adopted zoning
regulations; provided that where two or more noncontiguous munici-
palities have boundaries less than four miles apart, each is authorized
to control the zoning of land on its side of a line equidistant between
the two noncontiguous municipalities unless a town or county in the
affected area has adopted zoning regulations. Any city may thereafter
enforce such regulations in the area to the same extent as if such prop-
erty were situated within its corporate limits, until the county or town
board adopts a comprehensive zoning regulation which includes the
area. (emphasis added).
102. The clarification concerns municipality authority to regulate on the earth's
surface, in the air space above the surface, and in subsurface areas. Minn. Stat.




idential programs. 0 5
Another Minnesota Court of Appeals case, Good Neighbor
Care Center v. City of Little Canada,106 concerned the denial of a
building permit for a residential facility for four aged persons and
two houseparents.l0 7 The City Council denied the permit applica-
tion on the ground that the facility was not a permitted use under
the municipal ordinance provision governing single-family residen-
tial areas and Minn. Stat. § 462.357, subd. 7 (1982), which provided
that "mentally retarded and physically handicapped persons
should not be excluded by municipal zoning ordinances from the
benefits of normal residential surroundings." 08
The court ruled that a legislative distinction could not consti-
tutionally be made between the elderly and physically handi-
capped persons for the purposes of local zoning restrictions on
group homes.'0 9 According to the court, the exemption of facilities
for fewer than five residents from state licensing requirements
does not exclude such facilities from the protection of Minn. Stat.
§ 462.357, since the facilities hold derivative state licenses.110 Thus,
the court held that the Good Neighbor home was a permitted use
under the statute."'
In Horbal v. City of Ham Lake,112 the petitioners applied for
a conditional use permit to establish a group home for troubled ad-
olescents in an area zoned as single-family residential. 1is The city
denied the permit and raised four arguments to support its deci-
sion. The city argued that the group home would need close police
supervision, drawing the police away from other areas of the city;
the neighborhood watch program would suffer; the community
would be afraid of the residents; and the group home would oper-
ate for profit and was thereful commercial in nature.114 The court
ordered the city to grant the permit, holding that community fear
is not a sufficient reason to deny a conditional use permit and that
the for-profit nature of a group home is irrelevant in determining
105. Northwest Residence, 352 N.W.2d at 773.
106. 357 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
107. Id. at 160.
108. Id. at 160-61. Note that Minn. Stat § 462.357, subd. 7 (1982) has been
superceded by Minn. Stat. § 245A.11, subd. 2 (1988) which provides that "residential
programs with a licensed capacity of six or fewer persons shall be considered a per-
mitted single-family residential use of property for the purposes of zoning and
other land use regulations."
109. Id. at 162-63.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. 393 N.W.2d 5 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
113. Id. at 6.
114. Id. at 7.
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its residential or commercial nature. 115 The court further asserted
that there was no evidence of the need for increased police re-
sources as a result of establishment of the home, and that detri-
ment to the neighborhood watch program could be caused by any
new residents.116
The United States Supreme Court and Minnesota state court
decisions discussed above are binding in Minnesota. These deci-
sions establish, inter alia, that for the purpose of local zoning ordi-
nances, the term family includes functional families as well as
those persons related by blood or marriage. The permanency of
the living arrangement, existence of a head of household, and
sharing of household duties by the residents are factors which
must be considered in determining whether the residents of a
group home constitute a functional family. The decisions make it
clear that zoning power is held by the state legislature and dele-
gated, as determined appropriate, to municipalities. Therefore,
claims that state zoning legislation usurps local authority will fail.
According to the decisions, state law preempts local authority in
the area of appropriate operation of state-licensed community resi-
dential programs as set forth in state rules governing program
licensure.
The decisional law discussed in this section provides a foun-
dation for modifications to Minnesota legislation to promote com-
munity integration of residential programs. A summary of this
decisional law is located in Appendix B.
C. Case Law from Other Jurisdictions
While decisions from other jurisdictions are not binding in
Minnesota, they do provide information about legal trends and ju-
dicially established policy which the Minnesota courts and legisla-
ture may rely on for guidance. This section analyzes decisions
concerning group home issues.
1. Permitted Single-Family Use
A major area of litigation is whether a group home is a func-
tional family and thus a permitted single-family use. City of
White Plains v. Ferraioli 117 is a New York case which involved a
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974). In Costley v.
Caromin House Inc., 313 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 1981), the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that for the purpose of local zoning ordinances, the term family would be in-
terpreted liberally to include single housekeeping units which function as families.
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household consisting of a married couple, their two children and
ten foster children.'1 8 The Ferraioli court ruled that the house-
hold was a permitted single-family use because it resembled a
traditional family unit in theory, size, structure, and appearance."19
In rejecting arguments that the home was an institution or a
boarding house, the court asserted that the outward appearance of
the structure, the stability and permanency of the living arrange-
ment, and the household's intention to remain and develop ties in
the community emulated a traditional family.12o The court thus
distinguished the household from the communal living arrange-
ment in Belle Terre,121 where a group of college students shared a
house and commuted to a nearby school.122
A group home for six mentally retarded children and a mar-
ried couple acting as surrogate parents was declared a permitted
single-family use in Hessling v. City of BrooMfleld. s2 3 In terms of
family characteristics, the Colorado Supreme Court said the
Hessling household could not be distinguished from one consisting
of a married couple and six natural or adopted children.124 The
court acknowledged that the city had the power to control physical
use of the premises, but held that this power did not extend to dis-
tinguishing among the occupants making physical use of the
premises.125
In City of West Monroe v. Ouachita Association for Retarded
Children,126 a group home for six mentally retarded adults and
two houseparents was considered a permitted single-family use
and not a boarding house because the residents of the home were
living and working together toward common goals, had common
interests and problems, and were supervised by resident
houseparents.127
A group home for a licensed capacity of ten adults with
mental retardation was declared a permitted single-family use in
Costley, 313 N.W.2d at 24-25. As support for this interpretation, the court cited City
of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449.
Costley, 313 N.W.2d at 25. See supra text accompanying notes 72-89 for a discussion
of Costley.
118. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d at 300, 313 N.E.2d at 757, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 450.
119. Id. at 303, 313 N.E.2d at 757, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 450-51.
120. Id. at 304-05, 313 N.E.2d at 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
121. Village of Belle Terre v. Borass, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 56-59 for a discussion of Belle Terre.
123. 193 Colo. 124, 563 P.2d 12 (1977).
124. Id. at 127, 563 P.2d at 14.
125. Id. at 128, 563 P.2d at 14 (citing Y.W.C.A. v. Board of Adjustment, 134 N.J.
Super. 384, 341 A.2d 356 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975)).
126. 402 So.2d 259 (L. Ct. App. 1981).
127. Id. at 265.
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Oliver v. Zoning Commission,128 since state licensing regulations
contemplated that the home would operate as a single housekeep-
ing unit under the supervision of houseparents.129 The court de-
clined to set a limit on the size of a family unit, deferring to
standards established by state licensing regulations and building,
fire, safety, and public health codes.130
A New Jersey court declared a group home for five adults
with mental illness a permitted use in a single-family residential
area in Township of Washington v. Central Bergen Community
Health Center.131 The court based this characterization of the
home as a single housekeeping unit on its outward appearance
which was indistinguishable from similar one-family residences in
the community; the permanent rather than transitory character of
the residence; and the joint responsibilities of the occupants in
cooking, cleaning, and shopping.132 The traditional family charac-
ter of the residence was not upset by a part-time worker providing
supervisory services.133 The court also placed some emphasis on
the fact that no medical or therapeutic services were offered at the
residence.13 4
In Incorporated Village of Freeport v. Association for the
Help of Retarded Children,135 a New York court held that a group
home for eight women with mental retardation was a residential
use that would not conflict with a stable, uncongested single-fam-
ily environment. 36 Quoting City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, the
court reiterated that "[z]oning is intended to control types of hous-
ing and living and not the genetic or intimate internal family rela-
tions of human beings."13 7 In declaring the proposed home the
equivalent of a single-family use, the court relied on the deliberate
attempt by the Department of Mental Hygiene and the provider to
create a family unit and the relatively stable and permanent na-
ture of the household. 3 8
Where six residents with mental retardation, supervised by
128. 31 Conn. Supp. 197, 326 A.2d 841 (C.P. 1974).
129. Id. at 205, 326 A.2d at 846.
130. Id., 326 A.2d at 845.
131. 156 N.J. Super. 388, 383 A.2d 1194 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978).
132. Id. at 418-19, 383 A.2d at 1209.
133. Id. at 418, 383 A.2d at 1209.
134. Id. at 419, 383 A.2d at 1209.
135. 94 Misc.2d 1048, 406 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct.), order aff'd 60 A.D.2d 644, 400
N.Y.S.2d 724 (App. Div. 1977).
136. Id. at 1049, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
137. Id. (quoting City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 305, 313 N.E.2d




rotating staff, would participate in household duties such as wash-
ing dishes, making beds, preparing meals, and setting the table, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the group home consti-
tuted a single housekeeping unit and, as such, was a permitted sin-
gle-family use.139
A group home for up to twelve children with mental retarda-
tion and rotating houseparents was held by a New York court to
constitute a family in Little Neck Community Association v.
Working Organization for Retarded Children.140 The court based
its decision on the fact that, pursuant to state law governing the
establishment of residential programs, the home was specifically
designed to emulate a reasonably sized biological unitary family.141
Distinguishing the case from Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,142
the court noted that the proposed group home would not provide
transitory housing or introduce a life-style repugnant to family
values.143 The court rejected the argument that the group home
could be more properly characterized as an institution because the
children's handicaps would require special care and prevent them
from establishing normal family relations among themselves.144
While the preceding decisions have demonstrated courts' will-
ingness to characterize residents of group homes as families, some
courts have refused this characterization for the purpose of local
zoning ordinances. The case of Penobscot Area Housing Develop-
ment Corp. v. City of Brewer145 involved a group home for six
adults with mental retardation and a rotating staff.'4 The court
held that the group home more closely resembled a boarding
house than a traditional family and was therefore properly ex-
cluded from a single-family residential area.147 The holding was
based, in part, on the fact that the group home would not include
houseparents. The court reasoned that traditional family units in-
clude "one or more resident authority figures charged with the re-
sponsibility of maintaining a separate housekeeping unit and
regulating the activity and duties of the other residents."'148 Stabi-
lization and coordination of household activity by a resident au-
139. Mongony v. Bevilacqua, 432 A.2d 661 (R.I. 1981).
140. 52 A.D.2d 90, 383 N.Y.S.2d 364 (App. Div. 1976).
141. Id. at 94, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
142. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). See supra text accompanying notes 56-59 for a discussion
of Belle Terre.
143. Little Neck Community Ass'n, 52 A.D.2d at 94, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
144. Id. at 94-95, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
145. 434 A.2d 14 (Me. 1981).
146. Id. at 21.
147. Id. at 22.
148. Id. at 21.
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thority figure was seen as consistent with a family life-style.149
Another factor influencing the court's decision was that the aver-
age length of stay for the group home residents was only one to
one and one-half years.150 The court held that this factor was not
consistent with the development of permanent and cohesive rela-
tionships, characteristic of those between traditional family mem-
bers, amongst the residents of the group home.' 15 Finally, the
court noted that extensive outside aid in the management and op-
eration of the group home belied its family nature.152
In Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Association,5 3 a decision
that has been criticized,54 the Ohio Supreme Court denied "famo-
ily" status for zoning purposes to a group home for eight adults
with mental retardation. 5 5 The court based its decision on the
purpose for which the home would be established, i.e., to bring to-
gether a group of developmentally disabled persons for their train-
ing and education in life skills.5 6 The group home residents were
contrasted with traditional single-housekeeping units which join
together in a dwelling to share and maintain a household.57
The Washington Court of Appeals, in Culp v. City of Seat-
tie,'5 8 held that a group home for up to twelve mentally retarded
children could be excluded from an area zoned as single-family
residential.1 59 The basis for the decision was that children super-
vised by rotating staff would not be compatible with the traditional
notion of a family.160
149. Id.
150. Id. at 22.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 63 Ohio St.2d 259, 407 N.E.2d 1369 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 911 (1981).
154. See, e.g., Note, Garcia v. Siffrin. Ohio's Cities May Deny Their Retarded
Citizens the Least Restrictive Living Environment, 11 Cap. U.L. Rev. 111 (1981).
The author states that testimony at the Garcia trial indicated that the residents
would work in the community, cook and eat together, be assigned responsibility for
household chores, and socialize within the home. Id. at 124. The Note concludes
that "[a] focus on the use and character of the home, rather than on its purpose, is
appropriate in such cases," and that appropriate criteria to establish whether the
occupants of a residence function as a family include shared responsibility for
housework, eating meals together, and the presence of surrogate parents. Use of
these criteria would likely have resulted in classification of the group home resi-
dents as "family." Id. at 124-25 (citing Comment, Exclusionary Zoning and Its Ef-
fects on Group Homes in Areas Zoned for Single-Family Dwellings, 24 U. Kan. L.
Rev. 677, 693 (1976)).
155. Garcia, 630 Ohio St.2d at 268, 407 N.E.2d at 1376.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. 22 Wash. App. 618, 590 P.2d 1288 (Ct. App. 1979).
159. Id. at 618-19, 590 P.2d at 1289.
160. Id. at 620-21, 590 P.2d at 1290.
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The case of Crane Neck Association, Inc. v. New York City!
Long Island County Services Group 161 involved a restrictive cove-
nant limiting residences to those which both architecturally and
functionally serve as single-family dwellings.162 The court held
that a group home occupied by eight disabled adults was not a
functional family because of the presence of a large number of
nonresident staff, including nurses, therapists, dieticians, and
others and the absence of regular houseparents.163
In general, these decisions regarding permitted single-family
use from jurisdictions outside Minnesota establish that group
homes resembling the traditional family unit in theory, size, struc-
ture, and appearance will be considered a functional family and
thus a permitted single-family use for zoning purposes. A sum-
mary of this case law outside Minnesota concerning single-family
use is located in Appendix B.
2. State Preemption of Local Ordinances
Many states have enacted legislation designed to override
local zoning ordinances which frustrate state policy objectives asso-
ciated with the establishment of group homes in residential areas.
With one exception,164 courts have upheld the statutes because
they are reasonably related to a legitimate government
objective.165
In City of Los Angeles v. California Department of Health,166
the court upheld a statute conferring permitted use status in all
residential zones on group homes with six or fewer residents.167
The court reasoned that the statute concerned a matter of state-
wide concern which transcended municipal boundaries and there-
fore preempted municipal regulation in the field.168
In Glennon Heights, Inc. v. Central Bank & Trust,16 9 the Col-
orado Supreme Court held that enactment of a Colorado statute,
which makes state-licensed group homes serving eight or fewer de-
velopmentally disabled persons a permitted use in all residential
161. 61 N.Y.2d 154, 460 N.E.2d 1336, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1984).
162. Id. at 158-59, 460 N.E.2d at 1338, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
163. Id. at 160, 460 N.E.2d at 1339, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 904. Although the court re-
fused to find the group home a functional family, it held that public policy prohib-
ited enforcement of the restrictive covenant. Id.
164. Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Ass'n, 63 Ohio St.2d 259, 407 N.E.2d 1369 (1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 911 (1981). See infra text accompanying notes 191 and 196.
165. See 2 Rathkopf & Rathkopf, supra note 25, at § 17A.05.
166. 63 Cal.App.3d 473, 133 Cal. Rptr. 771 (Ct. App. 1976).
167. Id. at 476, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
168. Id. at 479-80, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 774-75.
169. 658 P.2d 872 (Colo. 1983).
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areas, through the usual legislative process did not violate neigh-
boring property owners' due process rights.170 The express reser-
vation to municipalities of the right to regulate several aspects of
the group homes in order to avoid adverse impacts was evidence
that the legislature had considered the concerns of property own-
ers and local government. 171 According to the court, the legisla-
tion did not constitute usurpation of local authority in that "[t]he
power to promulgate zoning regulations in furtherance of the gen-
eral health, safety and welfare is reposed in the legislative branch
of state government, and any such legislative powers of statutory
cities are derived through a delegation of state power."172
A New York court rejected a constitutional challenge to the
Padavan Law 73 in Zubli v. Community Mainstreaming Associ-
ates, Inc..174 The Padavan Law provides, inter alia, that group
homes shall be considered family units for the purpose of local or-
dinances. 17 Addressing the plaintiffs' due process claim, the court
ruled that the absence of provisions in the legislation for notice
and public hearing before siting of a group home did not render
the legislation constitutionally defective.' 7 6 According to the
court, notice and hearing are required by due process only in
quasi-judicial or adjudicatory settings, and not with respect to leg-
islation, where due process rights are protected by the democratic
process.17 7 The court further asserted that the Padavan Law was a
reasonable exercise of the state's police power, and therefore not
an unconstitutional use of zoning power.178 Finally, the Padavan
Law was held not to constitute taking of property by the state
without just compensation, since there was no taking either by
physical invasion or direct legal restraint on the use of property.179
The court declared that "as a matter of law, adjacent property
owners are not deprived of their property because of the State's
use of a contiguous property," even where the value of the prop-
170. Id. at 877-78.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 876.
173. N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 41.34 (McKinney 1988). The statute is named
for State Senator Frank Padavan, Chairman of the New York State Senate Mental
Hygiene and Addiction Control Committee.
174. 102 Misc.2d 320, 423 N.Y.S.2d 982 (Sup. Ct. 1979), aff'd, 74 A.D.2d 624, 425
N.Y.S.2d 263 (App. Div. 1980).
175. N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 41.34(f).
176. Zubli, 102 Misc.2d at 333, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 992.
177. Id. at 333, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 992 (citing San Diego Building Contractors Ass'n
v. City Council of City of San Diego, 13 Cal.3d 205, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146, 529 P.2d 570
(1974), appeal dismissed, 427 U.S. 901 (1976)).
178. Id. at 337-38, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 994-95.
179. Id. at 336, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 993-94.
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erty of the adjacent owner is decreased. 8 0
In Mahrt v. City of Kalispell,Bls the Montana Supreme Court
dismissed the appeal of a decision granting a conditional use per-
mit to a group home as meritless and frivolous. 8 2 The court
stated that it would "not require community residential facilities
to repeatedly defend their well established right to locate in any
residential area in Montana." 8 3 The court based its decision on a
Montana law governing group homes.'8 4
In Nichols v. Tullahoma Open Door, Inc. ,185 the Tennessee
Court of Appeals rejected a constitutional challenge to a state law
which made group homes for eight or fewer mentally retarded,
mentally disabled, or physically handicapped persons a permitted
single-family use. The plaintiffs claimed the law violated their due
process and equal protection rights, and that the legislation im-
properly usurped local zoning powers. 8 6 Responding to the first
claim, the court noted that no due process claim could properly be
made since the statute did not result in the taking of property. 8 7
The plaintiffs' equal protection argument arose because benefits of
the statute extended to disabled persons but not to others.'8 8 The
court also dismissed this argument, declaring the statute had a rea-
sonable basis and did not operate arbitrarily.89 Speaking to the
claim that the legislation usurped local power, the court held that
municipalities in Tennessee have no authority other than that
granted by the legislature, and that the legislature may remove or
alter the authority as it chooses. 190 The court thus distinguished
Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Association,191 a case in which the
Ohio Supreme Court invalidated a state statute which conferred
permitted use status on group homes for not more than eight per-
sons with developmental disabilities based on the Ohio Constitu-
tion's direct grant of zoning authority to Ohio municipalities.192
The power to zone is not an inherent right of cities in Michi-
gan, according to City of Livonia v. Department of Social Serv-
180. Id. at 332, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 994.
181. 213 Mont. 96, 690 P.2d 418 (1984).
182. Id. at 97, 690 P.2d at 419.
183. Id.
184. Id. (citing Mont. Code Ann. §§ 76-2-411, 76-2-412 (1983)).
185. 640 S.W.2d 13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).
186. Id. at 16, 18.
187. Id. at 16-17.
188. Id. at 18.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 63 Ohio St.2d 259, 407 N.E.2d 1369 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 911 (1981).




ices.193 While the Livonia court recognized a protected property
interest in the value, use, and enjoyment of private property,194
the plaintiffs' due process claim was rejected because they failed to
allege deprivation of any of these property rights as a result of li-
censure and siting of a group home for six or fewer developmen-
tally disabled adults.195
In the cases cited above, only Garcia v. Siffrin Residential
Association 196 struck down legislation preempting a local zoning
ordinance. The Garcia decision, however, was based on the direct
grant of zoning authority by the Ohio Constitution to municipali-
ties in that state;197 this case is clearly inapplicable in Minnesota,
where the power to zone is held by the state legislature and dele-
gated to municipalities.198
These decisions establish that preemptive zoning legislation
which is reasonable 99 and deals with a matter of statewide con-
cern,200 such as the integration of individuals with developmental
disabilities or mental illness into normal, residential communities,
will be upheld. A summary of preemption case law is in Appendix
B.
IV. Government and Community Involvement
The observations of two groups which are often involved in
siting controversies support the need for increased government in-
volvement in the process. A 1988 St. Paul Planning Commission
Task Force Report2 01 concluded that community opposition is re-
lated to a perceived lack of accountability for community residen-
tial programs.202 The report recommended that city, county, and
state government should work together to establish a process for
receiving and resolving neighborhood concerns and complaints.203
Advocates for persons with mental illness believe that increased
193. 423 Mich. 466, 493, 378 N.W.2d 402, 415 (1985).
194. Id. at 507, 378 N.W.2d at 421.
195. Id. at 507-08, 378 N.W.2d at 421-22.
196. 63 Ohio St.2d 259, 407 N.E.2d 1369 (1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 911 (1981).
197. Id. at 269, 407 N.E.2d at 1377 (citing Ohio Const. art. XVIII, § 3).
198. Denney v. City of Duluth, 295 Minn. 22, 26, 202 N.W.2d 892, 894 (1972).
199. Glennon Heights, Inc. v. Central Bank & Trust, 658 P.2d 872 (Colo. 1983);
Zubli v. Community Mainstreaming Assoc., Inc., 102 Misc.2d 320, 423 N.Y.S.2d 982
(Sup. Ct. 1979), cff'd, 74 A.D.2d 624, 425 N.Y.S.2d 263 (App. Div. 1980); Nichols v.
Tullahoma Open Door, Inc., 640 S.W.2d 13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).
200. City of Los Angeles v. California Dep't of Health, 63 Cal. App.3d 473, 133
Cal. Rptr. 771 (Ct. App. 1976).
201. St. Paul Planning Commission Task Force on Community Residential Facil-
ities, supra note 30.
202. Id. at 17.
203. Id. at 3.
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government involvement in the community residential program
siting process could reduce community opposition.204 These advo-
cates reason that communities may be less likely to take specific
action to oppose a siting if they must contend with the government
and its legal resources.20 5
Community opposition often works through the conditional
use permit process to keep residential programs out of desirable
neighborhoods. 206 There are various ways to attempt to neutralize
this opposition, including negotiation with the specific neighbor-
hood in which a residential program siting is planned, educational
programs aimed at the neighborhood, and increased government
involvement in the siting process. Based on a study by the Ameri-
can Planning Association, specific efforts to educate neighborhoods
prior to the siting of a group home are counterproductive.27
Studies call for education and involvement of citizens on a broader
level than specific siting controversies. A recent study of commu-
nity resistance to residential programs indicates that the involve-
ment of the community in the siting process was not associated
with decreased opposition and that resident characteristics were
not related to the likelihood of encountering community resist-
ance.208 The study also suggests that education efforts directed
toward specific communities may have unintended negative conse-
quences and may provoke rather than minimize opposition.20 9
A 1975 study completed by the University of Minnesota
Center for Urban and Regional Affairs (CURA) reported "that no
amount of educational programs before or presentations during
the controversy about constitutional or human rights or about the
benign nature of mentally retarded children and adults will signifi-
cantly change the minds of those organized in opposition."210 The
204. Telephone interview with Bill Conley, Legislative Consultant with Mental
Health Association (Mar. 16, 1989).
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 92.
207. Jaffe & Smith, supra note 21, at 33.
208. See CRISP, supra note 38, at 11 (summarizing Marsha Seltzer, Correlates of
Community Opposition to Community Residences for Mentally Retarded Persons, 1
American J. Mental Deficiency 89 (1984)). Seltzer concluded, on the basis of this
study, that intensive community education campaigns before a facility opens may
not be the method of choice and in some cases may actually mobilize community
opposition. Id.
209. Id.
210. See Friedlob & Anding, supra note 37, at 29 (quoting Earl Craig Associates,
Inc., A Political Strategy to Combat Community Resistance to Residential Facilities
for the Mentally Retarded in Minnesota: A Preliminary Report to the Department
of Public Welfare (not dated)).
The Seltzer and Friedlob & Anding studies deal with community reaction to
residential programs for persons with mental retardation. Since opposition related
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CURA report thus suggests that hostility towards community resi-
dential programs might be reduced if citizens are involved and in-
formed on a broader level than specific siting controversies. This
involvement might include citizen representation on a state facility
distribution task force. Educating the general public about the
need for facilities, financial status of community residential pro-
grams, licensing requirements, and government responsibility for
licensing would demonstrate that community residential programs
are a legitimate and important government concern.
Although the research indicates that the best approach to the
siting of community residential programs is one which is low-pro-
file, coupled with general education and increased community in-
volvement on a broad level, several states have enacted legislation
which requires community involvement in the siting of specific
residential programs. Other states ensure community involvement
on a broader level. A few states mandate government involvement
in the siting process. The following review of these varying state
approaches suggests methods to reduce opposition to the establish-
ment of group homes or to facilitate the location of such homes.
Before the establishment of a group home in a residential
area, Arizona law requires notification of the affected local govern-
ment.211 The local government unit may contest the siting of the
group home and request an administrative hearing.212 Since the
statute does not specify standards which must be applied to evi-
dence presented at the hearing, it appears that the purpose of the
hearing is to provide a forum for community grievances.
Connecticut law provides that a resident of a municipality in
which a group home is located may, with approval of the municipal
governing body, petition the state to revoke the license of the
group home.213 This statutory provision requires government in-
volvement in siting controversies by giving community residents
access to the licensing authority.
The Louisiana Supreme Court struck down, as violative of
the equal protection clause, a state statute214 requiring group home
managers to secure site approval from the local governing author-
to programs for both persons with mental illness and mental retardation is
grounded in unsubstantiated fear and prejudice (see Tuoni, supra note 4; Allport,
supra note 5), it follows that similar strategies should be employed for dealing with
community opposition to residential programs for each population.
211. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-582(I) (1986).
212. Id.
213. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 8-3e (West Supp. 1988).
214. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28:478(c) (West 1981).
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ity.215 According to the court, the local approval requirement,
which only applied to community residences for people with
mental retardation, was based on unfounded prejudice and not on
a legitimate state interest.216 The court held that restrictive zon-
ing practices aimed at group homes must be based on valid govern-
ment objectives, not on fear and prejudice.217
In Florida, local governments prepare comprehensive land
use plans which must be submitted to the state land use planning
agency for a determination as to whether the plans comply with
statutory requirements.218 Local plans must include provisions for
adequate group home sites, and must be compatible with and fur-
ther the state comprehensive plan.219 The Administration Com-
mission makes final compliance decisions following an
administrative hearing.220 The public is involved in the prepara-
tion of the local plan as well as the administrative hearing if one is
convened.22 ' This approach changes the posture of the group
home zoning ordinance issue from one where a local government's
position is defensive or resistant to one which places responsibility
for group home siting at the local level.
Both public and private group homes for persons with devel-
opmental disabilities are operated in Maryland.2 22 Public group
homes are owned by or leased to the state, while private group
homes are owned by nongovernmental parties.223 Maryland law
provides that, upon a determination of need for a public group
home, the affected county, in consultation with local consumer
groups, must select a site in accordance with state plan require-
ments.2 24 The state is required to help the county choose a suita-
ble site, and if the county defaults, the responsibility for locating a
suitable site falls on the state.225 After a public hearing, the site is
recommended to the Board of Public Works.226 If approved, the
state acquires the site, renovates the building, and finds a suitable
private, nonprofit entity to operate the group home, on terms and
215. Clark v. Manuel, 463 So.2d 1276, 1286 (La. 1985).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 163.3167, 163.3184 (West Supp. 1989).
219. Id. § 163.3177.
220. Id. § 163.3184.
221. Id.
222. Md. Health-Gen. Code Ann. § 7-602 (Supp. 1988).
223. Id.
224. Id. §§ 7-604, 7-605.




conditions approved by the state.227
Private group homes in Maryland must obtain both a license
and a certificate of approval from the state.2 28 The investigation
process following application for such a certificate includes a pub-
lic hearing conducted by the state.229 Before the hearing, the state
must notify local government officials and publish notices in a lo-
cal newspaper with substantial circulation. 230 A certificate of ap-
proval must be issued if statutory criteria are met.23 1 These
criteria include all general zoning requirements that apply to the
site, such as building height, size, open space, and density require-
ments. 232 Thus, Maryland law gives state government final au-
thority concerning compliance with local zoning ordinances.
Recognizing the political pressures which operate when local
elected officials decide land use issues, Maryland law removes deci-
sions concerning group home establishment to the state adminis-
trative level.
Reacting to obstacles which community opposition had posed
against the establishment of community residences for disabled
persons, New York enacted the Padavan Law233 in 1978. The stat-
ute attempts to facilitate the development of community resi-
dences while giving municipalities input into site selection. 234
Recognition is given both to the need to encourage establishment
of community residences and the concerns of municipalities re-
garding siting.
Under the Padavan Law, a community residence provider
must send written notification of intent to establish a residence to
the affected municipality. 235 Within forty days of receipt, the mu-
nicipality must respond by approving the site, suggesting alterna-
tive sites, or objecting to the community residence because its
establishment would result in concentration of such facilities.236 If
the municipality does not respond within forty days, the provider
is free to establish the residence.237 The municipality may hold a
227. Id. § 7-606.
228. Id. § 7-608.
229. Id. § 7-611.
230. Id.
231. Id. § 7-612.
232. Id. § 7-609.
233. N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 41.34 (McKinney 1988). See supra note 173 and
accompanying text.
234. See Robert L. Schonfeld, "Not in My Neighborhood" Legal Challenges to the
Establishment of Community Residences for the Mentally Disabled in New York
State, 13 Fordham Urb. L.J. 281, 283 (1985).
235. N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 41.34(c)(1).
236. Id. § 41.34(c)(1)(A)(B)(C).
237. Id. § 41.34(c)(1).
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public hearing before it responds.23 8 The options available to the
municipality, however, foreclose objection on grounds such as the
residence would lower property values, create more traffic, or re-
sult in increased crime.23 9 If a satisfactory alternative is suggested,
the community residence must locate there.24 0 When the sug-
gested alternative site is unsatisfactory with regard to nature, size,
or community support requirements, the provider must notify the
municipality which is then required to provide another alternative
within fifteen days.241 If the provider and the municipality cannot
agree, either may request an immediate hearing in front of the
commissioner of the state agency responsible for licensing commu-
nity residences.242 Under the statute, the hearing decision must be
based on the following criteria: the need for such a facility in the
municipality, existing concentration, and whether establishment of
the residence would change the nature and character of the
area.243 The law also provides for judicial review of the adminis-
trative decision.24 4
Critics argue that the statute is an impediment to the devel-
opment of community residences.245 Sites identified at the begin-
ning of the lengthy Padavan process may be lost to other buyers
by the time the process ends. Since providers must accept satisfac-
tory alternatives suggested by municipalities, purchase of the iden-
tified property is not an option. As in Maryland, New York law
removes decision-making authority concerning the establishment
of community residences from elected local authorities to state ad-
ministrative officials. Judicial challenges to the New York admin-
istrative decisions are common.248 In many cases, however,
administrative decisions are favorable to the group home and the
burden of pursuing judicial review is on the community opposi-
tion.247 In systems such as New York's, where state government
intervenes in zoning disputes, the heavy burden of initiating court
action often is transferred from the provider to the community.
South Carolina law requires the provider to notify the local
governing body of the location of the proposed group home.248 If
238. Id. § 41.34(c)(2).
239. See Schonfeld, supra note 234, at 302-03.
240. N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 41.34(c)(4).
241. Id. § 41.34(c)(5).
242. id.
243. Id.
244. Id. § 41.34(d).
245. See, e.g., Schonfeld, supra note 234, at 300.
246. Id. at 285.
247. See cases cited id. at 328.
248. S.C. Code Ann. § 6-7-830(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
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the local government objects to the site, it must notify the provider
within fifteen days and appoint a representative to assist the pro-
vider in selection of a comparable alternative site.24 9 The provider
and the local government representative are required to select a
mutually agreeable third person.2 50 These three parties have
forty-five days to make a final selection of the site by majority
vote.2 51 The final selection is binding on both the provider and lo-
cal government. 252
Before a group home license is issued in West Virginia, the
state licensing agency must notify the affected municipality of the
location of the proposed group home.253 The municipality has
thirty days to file objections or request a hearing with the licens-
ing agency.254 The state licensing agency is required to hold an ad-
ministrative hearing when objections or a request for a hearing are
filed.255 West Virginia law also provides that neighborhood resi-
dents may file complaints concerning group homes with the state
licensing agency.256 The state agency must conduct an investiga-
tion upon receipt of a complaint stating specific conduct on the
part of a group home resident which adversely affects public
health and safety.2 57 If the complaint is substantiated, the agency
must reconsider the resident's placement in a community residen-
tial facility.25 8 While the complainant is entitled to the results of
the reconsideration, no private information about the group home
resident may be disclosed.259
The state approaches reviewed in this section suggest meth-
ods to reduce opposition to the establishment of a community resi-
dence in a neighborhood or to otherwise facilitate the location of
such residences. Increased state participation in the siting process
emphasizes the important role played by group homes and demon-
strates that the dispute is not simply over a single provider and a
discrete group of residents, but with overall policy objectives em-
braced by state government.
State participation can take the form of arbitration and final





253. W. Va. Code § 8-24-50b(b) (Supp. 1988).
254. Id.
255. Id.






through removal of consideration of proposed group home sitings
from the local to the state level of government. State agency offi-
cials do not have direct political accountability to neighborhood
residents, thus treatment of community residences will be more
equitable under this approach. Providers would be encouraged to
pursue sitings in unconcentrated areas, knowing that where a
favorable decision is reached at the state level, community oppo-
nents will be less likely to pursue judicial remedies. Where legal
action is taken, the support of state legal resources will reduce the
risks and financial burden associated with litigation.
After the establishment of a group home, the state agency
should continue its active participation by receiving community
complaints. This would serve to establish a mechanism to
promptly deal with legitimate complaints and also to remind com-
munity residents of state government's involvement. Action could
be taken to encourage local governments to take responsibility for
locating group homes in communities. One method would require
municipalities to provide county officials with a list of appropriate
group home sites. This list could be made available to group home
providers.
Thus, state level participation and accountability coupled
with a low-profile approach are important elements of a successful
strategy aimed at the community integration of persons with
mental illness. This integration will not occur where communities
and political figures directly accountable to the communities have
unfettered discretion to allow or prohibit residential programs for
persons with mental illness.
V. Conditional Use Permits
An issue closely related to government and community in-
volvement in group home sitings is the conditional use permit re-
quirement. In Minnesota, this requirement applies to group homes
serving more than six residents.26 0 Group homes for persons with
mental illness are especially impacted by this requirement since
the capacity of these homes often exceeds six. 26 1
As noted earlier, a permitted use is a use by right. A condi-
260. Minn. Stat. § 245A.11, subd. 2, 3 (1988). For the text of this statute, see
supra note 15.
Note that while subdivision 3 is entitled "Permitted Multi-family Residential
Use," the language of the subdivision provides no meaningful protection to larger
group homes from restrictive conditional use permit requirements. See supra text
accompanying notes 16-19.
261. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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tional use is one considered "troublesome" even though it logically
belongs in a particular district.262 Minnesota law authorizes mu-
nicipalities to designate certain types of land use as conditionally
permitted, i.e., approved only if zoning ordinance standards and
criteria are satisfied.263 Zoning ordinance standards are often
vague, leaving a great deal of discretion to municipalities as they
decide whether or not to grant a permit.
When a conditional use permit is denied, a provider can
either challenge the denial in court or look for another site.264
Although the results of litigation have been favorable,265 the time
and expense involved in pursuing judicial relief often foreclose
this option. Many providers opt for a different location instead.
The City of Brooklyn Center, Minnesota denied a conditional use
permit for the Bill Kelly House, a community residential program
for persons with mental illness. Bill Kelly House did not initiate
court action against the suburb and is currently located in a south
Minneapolis neighborhood. The Minnesota Department of Human
Rights has charged Brooklyn Center with discrimination as a re-
sult of the conditional use permit denial.266
Public hearings are a fundamental part of the conditional use
permit review process. 267 These hearings often become very
heated. As already discussed, concerns held by opponents of com-
munity residential programs are based on fear and prejudice and
often cannot be countered with reasoning or evidence.268 If public
hearings are simply a forum for the expression of community fear
and prejudice, serious questions arise concerning the propriety of
subjecting providers and, more importantly, the persons who hope
to live in the proposed group homes, to this ordeal.269
Despite the difficulties associated with conditional use per-
mits, most of the thirty-four states with preemptory group home
zoning legislation allow municipalities to require conditional use
permits for larger group homes that wish to locate in single- or
multi-family residential zones.2 70 Absent preemption, municipali-
ties will generally allow only four or fewer unrelated persons to
262. See supra note 32.
263. Minn. Stat. § 462.3595 (1988).
264. Minn. Stat. § 462.361 (1988).
265. See supra text accompanying notes 72-116.
266. Telephone interview with Stephen Cooper, Commissioner, Minn. Dept.
Human Rights (Feb. 24, 1988).
267. See supra text accompanying note 34.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
269. Jaffe & Smith, supra note 21, at 31.
270. Steinman, supra note 24, at 25-36.
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live together in a single family residential area.271 Those advocat-
ing the establishment of group homes in neighborhoods criticize
this rule, noting that group home residents function as a family
and municipalities do not exclude large or extended families from
single-family zones. 272 The competing interests involved when
preemptory legislation has been considered are local government's
historical control over land use and normalization goals.273 As a re-
sult, smaller, less threatening living arrangements that more
closely resembled traditional families were permitted in all resi-
dential areas, while municipalities retained control over larger
group homes.21 4 Advocates may have favored this approach be-
cause they viewed it as encouraging smaller, more homelike living
arrangements. It seems, however, that the interests of persons
with mental illness have been neglected by the zoning legislation
since group homes serving these persons generally are not small.
Minnesota law defines "small" group homes as those with a
capacity of six or fewer residents.275 Several states have expanded
the definition to include group homes serving a maximum of eight
residents.21 6 West Virginia permits group homes serving up to
eight developmentally disabled residents or up to twelve residents
with mental illness to locate, by right, in all residential areas.27 7
Thus, if the conditional use permit requirement in Minnesota is re-
tained, the definition of "small" group homes could be amended to
allow more than six residents. This option merits attention only if
financial considerations, e.g., minimum size necessary to ensure
economic viability of a group home accord with political
realities.278
A second option, short of total preemption of local zoning au-
thority with regard to community residential programs, is to allow
for state agency administrative review of local decisions concern-
ing conditional use permit applications. If the provider requests a
hearing, and the administrative hearing judge finds the denial de-
cision to be arbitrary or not supported by evidence, the decision
271. See, e.g., St. Paul Planning Commission Task Force on Community Residen-
tial Facilities, supra note 30, at 9.
272. See, e.g., Note, supra note 7, at 875.
273. See Zoning for Community Homes, supra note 9, at 804.
274. See Steinman, supra note 24, at 25-36.
275. Minn. Stat. § 245A.11, subd. 2 (1988).
276. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 30-28-115 (Supp. 1987); Idaho Code § 67-6530
(1980); Iowa Code Ann. § 414.22 (West Supp. 1988); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 30,
§ 4962-A (Supp. 1988); Mont. Code Ann. § 76-2-412 (1987); Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-24-
102 (1987); Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-2.5 (1986).
277. W. Va. Code §§ 27-17-1, 27-17-2 (1986).
278. See Zoning for Community Homes, supra note 9, at 807.
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would be reversed. The advantage of this approach is that it al-
lows local government to retain control, while providing for a re-
view of negative decisions which is quicker and less expensive than
judicial remedies. Additionally, the burden of initiating a court
challenge would be transferred from providers to local govern-
ment or community opposition. These parties might be reluctant
to pursue judicial remedies where the siting decision was upheld
by state government. This approach would be favored by advo-
cates who believe the state agency should play a more active role
in siting controversies. Local government would probably prefer
this method over complete loss of control. One disadvantage of the
system is that it would require state administrative resources. The
cost of the resources, however, would likely be less than costs asso-
ciated with judicial challenges and thwarted group home sitings.
Another disadvantage is that the conditional use permit process,
including public hearings, is retained.
While retaining all the procedural aspects of the conditional
use permit process, Maryland places decision-making responsibility
at the state government level.279 Compliance with zoning require-
ments is one criterion a private group home must meet before the
state agency will issue a certificate of approval.2 8 0 As part of the
approval process, the state agency notifies the affected municipal-
ity and neighborhood residents of the proposed group home and
holds a public hearing.28 ' This alternative has the advantage of re-
moving decision-making authority from politically accountable lo-
cal officials. Instead of using political power to effect denial of a
permit, community opposition has the burden of proving that the
proposed group home does not meet objective land use criteria.
Since negative decisions based on subjective factors are less likely
to result at the state level, group home providers and residents do
not face the significant litigation burden which is the only recourse
to negative local level decisions. Rather, this burden is transferred
to localities who must prove the merits of their case in court. Re-
taining the public hearing is a disadvantage of this alternative. 2 2 It
is very unlikely that localities would support this alternative since
it would be viewed as state usurpation of power formerly held by
localities.
Arizona and West Virginia require the state agency to notify
affected localities of receipt of applications for licensure from
279. See the discussion of Maryland law supra text accompanying notes 222-232.
280. Md. Health-Gen. Code Ann. § 7-609 (Supp. 1988).
281. Id. § 7-611.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 267-68.
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group homes2Sa which are a permitted residential use by operation
of state law.28 4 If a locality objects to the establishment of the
group home, the state agency holds a public hearing.285 Thus,
while state law does not allow localities to impose a conditional use
permit requirement on group homes, a forum to voice objections is
provided.
Ohio law permits group homes serving from nine to sixteen
persons to locate in multi-family residential areas, but municipali-
ties may designate these group homes a conditionally permitted
use.2S6 The statute limits the standards that can be imposed
through the conditional use permit process to those concerning ar-
chitectural compatibility, yard, parking, sign regulation, and con-
centration.2 8 7  This approach restricts municipalities to
consideration of traditional land use issues and prevents denial
based on factors related to the condition of the residents. In situa-
tions where there is substantial community opposition, however,
conditional use permits may be improperly denied under the guise
of one of the permitted standards. When this is the case, group
home providers must either bear the expense associated with a ju-
dicial remedy or find another location.
Wisconsin has eliminated local zoning ordinances as a barrier
to community integration of persons with mental illness. State
law designates community residential programs licensed by the
Department of Health and Human Services which serve from nine
to fifteen persons a permitted use in all residential areas except
those zoned exclusively for single- or two-family residences.2 88
The residences are, however, subject to the same building and
housing ordinances, codes, and regulations as similar residences lo-
cated in the same area.28 9 While this approach does not allow mu-
nicipalities to block the establishment of community residential
programs through the conditional use permit process, municipali-
ties are permitted to regulate yard size, parking, architectural com-
patibility, and other traditional land use issues. Group home
providers are not discouraged from locating in unconcentrated ar-
283. Ariz. Rev, Stat. Ann. § 36-582(I) (1986); W. Va. Code § 8-24-50b(b) (Supp.
1988).
284. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-582(A) (1986); W. Va. Code § 8-24-50b(a) (Supp.
1988).
285. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-582(I); W. Va. Code § 8-24-50b(b).
286. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5123.19(M) (Anderson 1989).
287. Id.
288. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 59.97(15)(d) (West 1988).
289. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 46.03(22)(b) (West 1987).
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eas by the delays and costs associated with the conditional use per-
mit requirement.
The Wisconsin approach has many positive features. Legisla-
tion designating larger group homes a permitted use in multi-fam-
ily areas will facilitate dispersal of group homes and promote
normalization goals for the residents of larger homes, primarily
persons with mental illness. Under a preemption statute, the lo-
cality's ability to regulate traditional land use issues should not be
upset. Narrow tailoring of the statute may reduce municipal oppo-
sition to preemption.
If political opposition to preemption is strong, the next best
approach is a requirement for state agency review of local deci-
sions concerning conditional use permits for group homes. As
stated above, with this option local government retains control,
while a less expensive and time-consuming remedy is available to
the provider.
In addition to allowing communities to impose a conditional
use permit requirement on residential programs for persons with
mental illness, some states have enacted legislation aimed at elimi-
nating group home ghettos. Concentration and dispersal legislation
is discussed in the next section.
VI. Concentration and Dispersal of Community Residential Programs
Several states have enacted legislation which establishes min-
imum distances, ranging from 1,200 feet to one mile, that must sep-
arate community residential programs.29 ° Minnesota has such a
separation requirement and additionally requires local agencies to
prepare plans to eliminate existing concentration of group
homes.29 1 While normalization through the prevention of group
home ghettos is the stated purpose of the legislation, the unstated
reason is to ensure that no community has more than its fair share
of a land use considered by many to be undesirable.292
Such separation legislation is vulnerable under the Cleburne
standard,293 since normalization is not furthered by separation re-
290. Steinman, supra note 24, at 21.
291. Minn. Stat. § 245A.11, subd. 3-5 (1988). For the text of this statute, see
supra note 15. While the statute requires concentrated counties to submit plans to
promote dispersal of established residential programs, there are no penalties if dis-
persal does not actually occur. Minn. Stat. § 245A.11, subd. 5. Other states have not
legislatively encouraged or required the dispersal of established group homes. See
Steinman supra note 24, at 21-22.
292. See Jaffe & Smith, supra note 21, at 11-13. See also Mpls. Star & Tribune,
July 24, 1988 at B1, col. 1.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 65-70. Under City of Cleburne Living
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quirements. Three factors account for the development of group
home ghettos: inexpensive housing, the availability of large resi-
dences for which there is little demand, and the ability of middle
and upper class neighborhoods to block, through local zoning ordi-
nances, the siting of community residential programs.294 None of
these factors is countered by separation requirements. Inexpen-
sive housing is necessary because low funding levels have been al-
located for residential programs serving persons with mental
illness.295 Given low funding levels, economies of scale dictate
large residential programs for these individuals. Large, inexpen-
sive housing is available almost exclusively in low income, inner
city neighborhoods. Where this housing is available in other
neighborhoods, state legislation endorses the use of local zoning
ordinances to block the siting of a residential program.296 Thus,
the way to prevent group home ghettos is to increase funding
levels and prohibit exclusionary zoning practices aimed at commu-
nity residential programs.
It may be argued that while separation requirements do not
address the problems which cause group home ghettos, the re-
quirements, by preventing any group home from locating within a
set distance from another, at least prevent further concentration.
This argument ignores normalization, the ultimate purpose at
which separation requirements are ostensibly directed.297 Separa-
tion requirements actually have a detrimental effect on normaliza-
tion goals. Group home ghettos arose out of necessity, not
choice.298 The number of available sites will remain constant
without increased funding levels. With the imposition of separa-
tion requirements, the number of available sites decreases. If sites
are more difficult or impossible to obtain, persons with mental ill-
ness will have less desirable or no housing alternatives. Since nor-
malization is not served and is, in fact, impeded by separation
legislation, it cannot be advanced as a defense to a constitutional
challenge. Therefore, under C/eburne, it is likely that separation
legislation would be struck down.
Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), which applies to persons with mental retardation and
probably extends to persons with mental illness, these groups are neither suspect
or quasi-suspect classes and therefore not entitled to heightened scrutiny. The
Court established, however, that classifications based on prejudice and unsubstanti-
ated fears alone would never pass constitutional muster. 473 U.S. at 446-48.
294. United States General Accounting Office, supra note 30, at 1; Jaffe &
Smith, supra note 21, at 12.
295. United States General Accounting Office, supra note 30, at 1.
296. Minn. Stat. § 245A.11, subd. 3 (1988).
297. See supra note 9 for the definition of "normalization."
298. Jaffe & Smith, supra note 21, at 12.
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Dispersal will take place, albeit gradually, if local zoning ordi-
nances are preempted, smaller living arrangements for persons
with mental illness are encouraged, and funding levels are in-
creased. A gradual approach would be more attentive to the pref-
erences of group home residents. Rather than transplanting
residents from one community to another, residents under a grad-
ual approach could choose between their current living arrange-
ment and another arrangement in a different community. This
concept of choice is "consistent with current practices that address
housing discrimination by encouraging individual liberties and
freedom of choice."2 99
County officials report, however, that dispersal according to
short-term time limits cannot be accomplished without a signifi-
cant allocation of resources to cover the expense of provider settle-
ment costs, higher interest rates, and remodeling expenses.3 00
VII. Recommendations
As established by Minnesota law, the power to zone in Min-
nesota exists only as delegated by the state legislature.3 01 The Min-
nesota Supreme Court upheld a state law designating residential
programs with a licensed capacity of six or fewer persons a permit-
ted single-family use for zoning purposes. 302 Courts in other states
have likewise rejected constitutional challenges to preemptive leg-
islation, reasoning that such legislation is reasonable and concerns
a matter of state-wide concern.3 03 Thus, courts probably will up-
hold the constitutionality of further reasonable preemptive legisla-
tion promoting community integration of residential programs.
Minnesota and other states with similar legislation should
strengthen preemptive zoning legislation so that community inte-
gration can become a reality for persons with mental illness.
Model preemptive legislation is set forth in Appendix A. The
299. Id. at 12-13.
300. Telephone interview with Marjorie Wherley, Program Supervisor, Adult
Housing, Hennepin County Community Services Department (Apr. 4, 1989).
301. Denney v. City of Duluth, 295 Minn. 22, 26, 202 N.W.2d 892, 894 (1972).
302. Costley v. Caromin House, 313 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 1981). See supra text ac-
companying notes 72-83 for a discussion of Costley.
303. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. California Dep't of Health, 63 Cal. App.3d
473, 133 Cal. Rptr. 771 (Ct. App. 1976); Glennon Heights, Inc. v. Central Bank &
Trust, 658 P.2d 872 (Colo. 1983); Zubli v. Community Mainstreaming Assoc., Inc.,
102 Misc. 2d 320, 423 N.Y.S.2d 982 (Sup. Ct, 1979), aff'd, 74 A.D.2d 624, 425 N.Y.S.2d
263 (App. Div. 1980); Mahrt v. City of Kalispell, 213 Mont. 96, 690 P.2d 418 (1984);
Nichols v. Tullahoma Open Door, Inc., 640 S.W.2d 13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982); City of
Livonia v. Department of Social Serv., 423 Mich. 466, 378 N.W.2d 402 (1985). But
see Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Ass'n, 63 Ohio St.2d 259, 407 N.E.2d 1369 (1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 911 (1981).
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model legislation draws from decisional law, studies reported in
this article, and approaches taken by other states. The remainder
of this section evaluates possible approaches to group home siting
presented by the various state methods discussed in Section IV.
A. Government and Community Involvement
The following is a list of possible approaches to government
and community involvement in group home siting.
Alternative 1
Provide for notification of the affected municipality and an ad-
ministrative hearing if the siting is opposed, where state legisla-
tion provides for preemption of local zoning authority related to
group home siting.30 4 This alternative is not suggested because ad-
ministrative hearings held simply to provide a forum for commu-
nity grievances are likely to increase rather than dissipate
opposition.3 05
Alternative 2
Create a mechanism by which the state licensing agency is accessi-
ble to communities and can receive and deal with community
complaints concerning group homes.30 6 By adopting this alterna-
tive, state government will become more responsive to communi-
ties once residential programs are established, ensuring that
problems are solved and relations between the program residents
and neighbors are not adversely affected as the result of lingering
and unresolved complaints. State agency accessibility to communi-
ties will also serve an educational function.
Alternative 3
Encourage local governments to take responsibility for locating
group homes in communities. One method would be to require
municipalities to provide county officials with a list of possible,
appropriate group home sites.30 7 Implementing this approach will
make municipalities partners rather than adversaries in the com-
munity integration effort.
304. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 36-581, 36-582 (1986); N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law
§ 41.34 (McKinney 1988); W. Va. Code § 8-24-50b (Supp. 1988).
305. See supra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
306. Connecticut provides community residents access to the state licensing au-
thority. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 8-3e (West Supp. 1988).
307. This recommendation is based on Florida legislation. Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 163.3177 (West Supp. 1988).
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B. Conditional Use Permit Requirement
The following approaches address the issue of conditional use
permit requirements for larger community residential programs.
Alternative 1
Designate residential programs with a licensed capacity in excess
of six persons a permitted multi-family residential use.30 8 This al-
ternative will best facilitate group home dispersal and promote
normalization goals for residents of larger group homes, particu-
larly persons with mental illness. In order to reduce opposition
from city government, a statute designating larger residential pro-
grams a permitted use in multi-family residential areas should be
narrowly tailored. States should set an upper limit on the number
of residents and allow a municipality to retain its ability to regu-
late traditional land use issues, such as yard size, parking, and ar-
chitectural compatibility.0 9
Alternative 2
Transfer authority for issuing conditional use permits from local
to state government.3 1 0 A state licensing process could include
wider consideration of land use issues and an opportunity for mu-
nicipalities to voice objections to proposed plans. Rather than to-
tally preempting local zoning ordinances, this approach gives state
government decision-making authority over local zoning ordinance
compliance issues. Decision-making authority is therefore located
at a level not as politically sensitive to local opposition to residen-
tial programs. State administrative expenses would replace the
burdens associated with the conditional use permit process.311
This alternative is second only to eliminating the conditional use
permit requirement.
Alternative 3
Provide for state administrative review of local denials of condi-
tional use permit applications. If a provider requests a hearing
and the administrative hearing judge finds the denial decision to
be arbitrary or not supported by evidence, the decision would be
reversed. This alternative allows local government to retain con-
trol over land use, while providing an appeals process which is
quicker and less expensive than judicial review. Additionally,
308. Wisconsin has adopted this approach. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 59.97(15)(d) (West
1988).
309. Compare Wis. Stat. Ann. § 46.03(22)(b), § 59.97(15)(d)(West 1988).
310. This alternative is based on Maryland law. See the discussion of Maryland
law supra text accompanying notes 222-232.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 264-269.
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when a denial is overturned, the burden of initiating a court chal-
lenge is on local government or community opposition. These par-
ties might be reluctant to pursue judicial remedies when state
government supports a particular siting decision. This alternative
is not recommended, however, because it retains the burdensome
local level public hearing and involves a siting process which could
be quite lengthy.
Conclusion
The deinstitutionalization movement has not returned per-
sons with mental illness to the communities where they grew up
or enabled them to live in communities of their choice. Rather, so-
ciety continues to shun them. One of the most powerful legal
methods used to keep mentally ill persons from residing in all but
the least desirable neighborhoods has been the local zoning ordi-
nance. As a condition precedent to locating in a particular commu-
nity, local zoning ordinances often compel community residential
program providers to obtain a conditional use permit. The stan-
dards in zoning ordinances are often vague, leaving a great deal of
discretion to municipalities as they decide whether or not to grant
a permit. A fundamental part of the conditional use permit pro-
cess is a public hearing. These hearings often become very heated
and local decisionmakers bend to the will of their constituents.
Minnesota, like many other states, enacted legislation aimed
at preempting these zoning ordinances. The legislation, however,
did not go far enough. While smaller residential programs were
designated a permitted use in all residential areas, larger pro-
grams, which primarily serve persons with mental illness, continue
to be a conditional use and are repeatedly excluded from desirable
neighborhoods.
Additionally, under the legislation, community residential
programs must be separated by at least 1,320 feet, larger programs
cannot be located in any highly concentrated planning district, and
counties including such a district must develop a plan to promote
dispersal of established programs. These concentration and disper-
sal requirements are patently offensive since they limit residential
choices available to persons with mental illness. Under the guise
of normalization, Minnesota concentration and dispersal legislation
actually promotes the "fair share" doctrine, by allowing neighbor-
hoods to accept no more than a token residential program.
The model legislation in Appendix A is designed to vigor-
ously promote the community integration of persons with mental
illness. Residential programs for this population are designated a
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permitted use, subject to legitimate zoning concerns such as build-
ing and housing codes and regulations which are applied to other
residences in the same area. The state agency responsible for li-
censing residential programs is given responsibility for ensuring
that normalization goals are promoted.
Persons with mental illness are entitled to the full rights of
citizenship. Legal means to exclude and isolate mentally ill per-
sons can no longer be tolerated. Community integration of persons
with mental illness can become a reality if preemptive zoning leg-
islation is passed.
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Appendix A: Model Statute
An Act to Establish the Right of Persons with Mental Illness to
Live in Residential Programs Located in Desirable Neighborhoods.
Subdivision 1. Policy statement. It is the policy of the state that
persons shall not be excluded by municipal zoning ordinances or
other land use regulations from the benefit of normal residential
surroundings.
Subdivision 2. Permitted single-family residential use. Residential
programs with a licensed capacity of six or fewer persons shall be
considered a permitted single-family residential use of property for
purposes of zoning and other land use regulations. Notwithstand-
ing licensed capacity, licensed residential programs operated in sin-
gle-family structures; providing permanent (as opposed to
transient) living arrangements; occupied by residents working to-
gether toward common goals, sharing common interests, problems,
and household responsibilities; and including resident
houseparents in cases where residents are in need of 24-hour su-
pervision, shall also be considered a permitted single-family resi-
dential use of property for purposes of zoning and other land use
regulations.
Subdivision 3. Permitted single-family residential use. A licensed
residential program with a licensed capacity in excess of six shall
be considered a permitted multi-family residential use of property
for the purposes of zoning and other land use regulations. Munici-
palities are permitted to regulate yard size, parking, architectural
compatibility, and building and housing codes to the same extent
as other residences in the area.
Subdivision 4. Location of residential programs. In determining
whether to grant a license, the commissioner shall specifically con-
sider the population, size, land use plan, availability of community
services, normalization opportunities, and the number and size of
existing licensed residential programs in the town, municipality, or
county in which the applicant seeks to operate a residential
program.
Subdivision 5. Community education. The commissioner shall
take action to educate all communities in this state about commu-
nity residential programs. This educational activity may include
collaboration with advocacy groups. The commissioner shall also
establish a system for receiving complaints concerning established
community residential programs. All complaints shall be
promptly resolved and the originator of the complaint shall be no-
tified of the nature of the resolution.
1989]
260 Law and Inequality [Vol. 7:215
Subdivision 6. Separation requirements. Municipalities shall not
establish minimum separation requirements applicable to commu-
nity residential programs.
Subdivision 7. Municipality responsibility. Each municipality
shall provide the county agency in which it is located, on an an-
nual basis, a list of available appropriate residential program sites
within the municipality.
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Appendix B: Case Law Summary
United States Supreme Court and Minnesota State Courts
" Local zoning ordinances are valid if they are reasonable, not ar-
bitrary, and substantially related to public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare.3 12
* Use of property by an unrelated single housekeeping unit
which is transient in nature and departs from traditional family
values may properly be excluded from a single-family residen-
tial area.313
" For the purpose of local zoning ordinances, "family" may not
be defined to exclude extended families. 314
" Municipalities may not discriminate against group homes on
the basis of irrational prejudice and unsubstantiated fear.315
" For the purpose of local zoning ordinances the term family will
not be interpreted as only those persons related by blood or
marriage. In determining whether a group home constitutes a
functional family, the following factors must be considered:
permanency of the living arrangement, existence of a head of
household, and sharing of household duties by the residents.3 16
" Operation of a state-licensed residential program by a for-profit
corporation does not automatically give the program commer-
cial status.317
* A group home complies with a single-family restrictive cove-
nant as long as it is a single housekeeping structure, a relatively
permanent type of living situation, and public policy supports
such an arrangement.318
" A municipality has no inherent power to zone. Zoning power is
held by the state legislature and delegated, in the manner de-
termined by the legislature, to municipalities. 319
" State law preempts local authority in the area of appropriate
operation of state-licensed community residential programs, as
set forth in state rules governing licensure of such programs.320
* Municipalities are permitted to impose on community residen-
312. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
313. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
314. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
315. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Horbal v.
City of Ham Lake, 393 N.W.2d 5 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
316. Costley v. Caromin House, Inc., 313 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 1981).
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Denney v. City of Duluth, 295 Minn. 22, 202 N.W.2d 892 (1972).
320. Northwest Residence, Inc. v. City of Brooklyn Center, 352 N.W.2d 764
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
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tial facilities only those special health and safety standards
which relate to the characteristics of a particular site, provided
such standards are uniformly applied to all sites in the district
which are similarly classified. Municipalities may not impose
special health and sfety standards to care of residents of state-
licensed community residential programs, to services provided
to residents, or to any other area covered by state rules gov-
erning licensure of community residential programs.32 1
Jurisdictions Outside Minnesota and Single-Family Use
" Group homes that resemble the traditional family unit in the-
ory, size, structure, and appearance will be considered a permit-
ted single-family use for zoning purposes.3 22
" Courts will look to whether the outward appearance of the
home is distinguishable from neighboring homes when evaluat-
ing the structure and appearance criteria.3 23
" To resemble a traditional family unit in theory, a group home
must offer a stable and permanent living arrangement. 324
" A showing that the household intends to remain and develop
ties in the community may help to convince the court that it
emulates a family.3 25
" The courts are divided as to whether resident houseparents are
a necessary component for a group home to be considered a
family for zoning purposes.326
321. Id.
322. City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d
449 (1974).
323. Id; Township of Washington v. Central Bergen Community Health Center,
156 N.J. Super. 388, 383 A.2d 1194 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978).
324. City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d
449 (1974); Hessling v. City of Broomfield, 193 Colo. 124, 563 P.2d 12 (1977); Town-
ship of Washington v. Central Bergen Community Health Center, 156 N.J. Super.
388, 383 A.2d 1194 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978); Incorporated Village of Freeport v.
Association for the Help of Retarded Children, 94 Misc. 2d 1048, 406 N.Y.S.2d 221
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 60 A.D.2d 644, 400 N.Y.S.2d 724 (App. Div. 1977); Little Neck Com-
munity Ass'n v. Working Organization for Retarded Children, 52 A.2d 90, 383
N.Y.S.2d 364 (App. Div. 1976).
325. City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d
449 (1974).
326. Compare Crane Neck Ass'n, Inc. v. New York City/Long Island County
Serv. Group, 61 N.Y.2d 154, 460 N.E.2d 1336, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1984); Hessling v.
City of Broomfield, 193 Colo. 124, 563 P.2d 12 (1977); City of West Monroe v. Ouach-
ita Ass'n for Retarded Children, 402 So.2d 259 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Oliver v. Zoning
Comm'n, 31 Conn. Supp. 197, 326 A.2d 841 (C.P. 1974); Penobscot Area Housing
Dev. Corp. v. City of Brewer, 434 A.2d 14 (Me. 1981); and Culp v. City of Seattle, 22
Wash. App. 618, 590 P.2 1288 (Ct. App. 1979) with Township of Washington v. Cen-
tral Bergen Community Health Center, 156 N.J. Super. 388, 383 A.2d 1194 (Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1978); Mongony v. Bevilacqua, 432 A.2d 661 (R.I. 1981); and Little
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" Family characteristics such as residents working together to-
ward common goals; developing cohesive and permanent rela-
tionships; and sharing common interests, problems, and
household responsibilities are sometimes determinative of a
group home's classification as a functional family. 3 2 7
" Extensive delivery of medical or therapeutic services may bar
classification of a group home as a functional family. 28
" The size of group homes considered functional families ranges
from six to twelve members. One court declined to set a limit
on the size of a family unit, deferring to state licensing stan-
dards and building, fire, safety, and public health codes.3 29
" Deliberate attempts by the state and the provider to emulate a
family unit have been persuasive in the determination that a
group home is a functional family.33
Jurisdictions Outside Minnesota and State Preemption of
Local Zoning Ordinances
" Preemptive zoning legislation which is reasonable and deals
with a matter of statewide concern will be upheld in states
where a municipality's power to zone is derived from legislative
delegation.3 3 '
* Property owners adjacent to a proposed group home do not
have a due process right to notice and hearing where state leg-
islation establishes that the group home is a permitted use.3 32
Neck Community Ass'n v. Working Organization for Retarded Children, 52 A.2d
90, 383 N.Y.S.2d 364 (App. Div. 1976).
327. City of West Monroe v. Ouchita Ass'n for Retarded Children, 402 So.2d 259
(La. Ct. App. 1981); Township of Washington v. Central Bergen Community Health
Center, 156 N.J. Super. 388, 383 A.2d 1194 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978); Mongony v.
Bevilacqua, 432 A.2d 661 (R.I. 1981); Penobscot Area Housing Dev. Corp. v. City of
Brewer, 434 A.2d 14 (Me. 1981).
328. Township of Washington v. Central Bergen Community Health Center, 156
N.J. Super. 388, 383 A.2d 1194 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978); Crane Neck Ass'n, Inc. v.
New York City/Long Island County Services Group, 61 N.Y.2d 154, 460 N.E.2d 1336,
472 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1984). But see Little Neck Community Ass'n v. Working Organi-
zation for Retarded Children, 52 A.2d 90, 383 N.Y.S.2d 364 (App. Div. 1976).
329. Oliver v. Zoning Comm'n of Town of Chester, 31 Conn. Supp. 197, 326 A.2d
841 (C.P. 1974).
330. Incorporated Village of Freeport v. Association for the Help of Retarded
Children, 94 Misc.2d 1048, 406 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct.), qff'd, 60 A.D.2d 644, 400
N.Y.S.2d 724 (App. Div. 1977); Little Neck Community Ass'n v. Working Organiza-
tion for Retarded Children, 52 A.2d 90, 383 N.Y.S.2d 364 (App. Div. 1976).
331. Glennon Heights, Inc. v. Central Bank & Trust, 658 P.2d 872 (Colo. 1983);
Zubli v. Community Mainstreaming Assoc., Inc., 102 Misc. 2d 320, 423 N.Y.S.2d 982
(Sup. Ct. 1979), aff'd, 74 A.D.2d 624, 425 N.Y.S.2d 263 (App. Div. 1980).
332. Glennon Heights, Inc. v. Central Bank & Trust, 658 P.2d 872 (Colo. 1983);
Nichols v. Tullahoma Open Door, Inc., 640 S.W.2d 13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).
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* Fifth amendment claims by neighbors of group homes have
been rejected because the neighboring property was not physi-
cally invaded nor was the use directly restrained.333
333. Zubli v. Community Mainstreaming Assoc., Inc., 102 Misc. 2d 320, 423
N.Y.S.2d 982 (Sup. Ct. 1979), aff'd, 74 A.D.2d 624, 425 N.Y.S.2d 263 (App. Div. 1980).
